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∎ Syria is central to the current shape of Turkey-Russia relations. It offers a 
model of partnership for both countries in a context where their interests 
are competitive. However, the Syrian-centric cooperation between Turkey 
and Russia is also special and is thus unlikely to be replicated elsewhere 
due to structural constraints and contextual nuances. 
∎ The limits of the Syrian-style model of cooperation between Ankara and 
Moscow can be observed in Libya as well as Nagorno-Karabakh. 
∎ Even though the institutional and elite ownership of Turkey’s Western 
relations has weakened, no similar institutional basis exists in Turkey’s 
relations with Russia. As such, the current Ankara-Moscow axis is to a 
great extent defined by the personal ties between the countries’ leaders 
and geopolitical imperatives. However, if the current shape of relations 
endures much longer, these personalised relations will gain structural 
foundations. 
∎ A major problem for Turkey in its relations with Russia remains the 
asymmetry, even if interdependent, in favour of Moscow. Yet, the nature 
of asymmetry is dynamic and subject to change, as Turkey has engaged in 
what can be termed dependency reduction on Russia, both geopolitically 
and structurally (energy-wise). 
∎ Developments at the broader international level, a new administration in 
the US, and rising tension between Ukraine and Russia indicate that 
Turkey would face more constraints and higher costs for its hitherto 
geopolitical balancing act between the West and Russia. 
∎ The close relations in recent years between Ankara and Moscow also 
point to the need for Turkey and the West to redefine the nature of their 
relations, as the Cold War framework of Turkey-US relations and the 
accession framework of Turkish-European relations increasingly appear 
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Issues and Conclusions 
Turkish-Russian Relations in Light 
of Recent Conflicts. Syria, Libya, and 
Nagorno-Karabakh 
Turkey is recalibrating its foreign and regional policy 
at a time when the Middle East is undergoing a major 
transformation and restructuring. Likewise, Russia 
appears to be reformulating its place in the interna-
tional system at a time when the nature and contours 
of the post–Cold War system are becoming less and 
less recognisable. Therefore, both Turkey and Russia 
are redefining their regional and international roles 
at the same time. 
From the war in Georgia (2008) to the Ukrainian 
crisis and the annexation of Crimea (2014), Russia has 
been reasserting itself in the post–Cold War inter-
national system for some time. It is seeking recogni-
tion as a great power as well as parity with the United 
States (US) – and hence a redefinition of the frame-
work of US-Russia relations. Arguably, it was within 
the context of the Syrian conflict – and later the 
Libyan and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts – that Rus-
sia’s goals manifested themselves most clearly. 
Similarly, it is primarily through Turkey’s policy on 
the Middle East that Ankara asserts its regional and 
international role. From Syria to Libya, and Iraq to 
the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey is pursuing a 
highly active and interventionist foreign policy. 
It is not only the growing roles of Turkey and 
Russia in the Middle East that are attracting interna-
tional scrutiny. It is also the nature of their engage-
ments and the competitive – if not adversarial – 
cooperation in this region that have surprised many 
analysts and observers. What drives Turkish-Russian 
relations? How to account for their increasingly close 
relations in the Middle East and beyond? How have 
their engagements on regional conflicts reshaped 
their bilateral relations? And how are these relations 
likely to evolve? This research paper examines these 
questions through the lenses of the conflicts in Syria, 
Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The latter is not geo-
graphically located in the Middle East. However, in 
their bilateral engagements, Ankara and Moscow 
appear to have established close connections between 
this conflict in the South Caucasus and their coopera-
tion and competition in other conflict zones in the 
Middle East. 
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Syria is central to the current shape of Turkey-
Russia relations. It offers a model of partnership for 
both countries in a context where their interests 
compete. In other words, through the Syrian conflict, 
Ankara and Moscow have discovered the value and 
effectiveness of bilateral engagements and limited 
regional multilateralism as a form of dealing with 
conflicts in which both actors are involved. However, 
the Syrian-centric cooperation between Turkey and 
Russia is also special and is thus unlikely to be repli-
cated elsewhere due to structural constraints and 
contextual nuances. The limits of the Syrian-style 
model of cooperation between Moscow and Ankara 
can be observed in Libya as well as Nagorno-
Karabakh. 
In spite of these limitations, an accounting of both 
actors’ increasingly close relations in recent years 
has become a challenge for analysts. Unlike Moscow, 
Ankara has to pay a price for these close relations – 
being removed from the F-35 fighter jet programme 
led by the US and slapped with the Countering Ameri-
ca’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) for 
its purchase of the Russian-made S-400 systems, in 
addition to the growing strains in Ankara’s relations 
with the West. Therefore, it is even more crucial to 
elucidate Turkey’s motives in seeking closer engage-
ments with Moscow. Broadly speaking, there are three 
dominant explanatory accounts for why Turkey is 
seeking cooperation: political (discontent with the 
West), systemic, and personality-centric frameworks. 
The boundaries between these different accounts are 
not clear-cut. All of them shed light on important 
aspects of these ties, however none of them alone can 
provide an overarching account of these relations. 
Different accounts are better suited for explaining 
the different stages of these relations. For instance, 
Turkey’s discontent with the West – coupled with 
the systemic changes in the Middle East’s relations 
with international powers – helps to explain the 
formation of closer relations between the two actors 
in mid-2016. However, the personal rapport between 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Vladimir Putin has been 
crucial in keeping these relations on track in the face 
of many crises and challenges since then. In fact, 
given the weakness of the institutional agency in this 
relationship, it is not clear to what extent what we 
discuss as Ankara-Moscow relations are fundamental-
ly Putin-Erdoğan relations. Both actors are the ulti-
mate decision-makers in their respective countries, 
therefore this distinction at this stage does not mean 
much policy-wise, but it is crucial when projecting 
the future course of these relations. 
A major problem for Turkey in its relations with 
Russia remains the asymmetry, even if interdepend-
ent, in favour of Moscow. Yet, the nature of asym-
metry is dynamic and subject to change, as Turkey 
has engaged in what can be termed “dependency 
reduction” on Russia, both geopolitically and struc-
turally (in terms of energy dependency on Russia). 
Finally, as a result of the increasingly close rela-
tions between Ankara and Moscow (coupled with the 
growing gap between Turkey and the West, both in 
the domestic and foreign policy realms), the nature, 
meaning, and content of Turkish-Western relations 
are undergoing major changes, and Turkey’s place in 
the broader Western system is increasingly being 
questioned. Going forward, these developments, in 
return, will trigger more calls both in the West and in 
Turkey to redefine the framework and meaning of 
Turkish-Western relations, as the Cold War frame-
work of Turkey-US relations and the accession frame-
work of Turkish-European relations increasingly 
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No single issue has shaped Turkish-Russian relations 
in recent decades as much as the crisis in Syria. It 
gave birth to a partnership model between both with-
in the context of a crisis in which there were adver-
sarial interests. Whenever there is a new geopolitical 
crisis in which both Ankara and Moscow are involved, 
they have almost impulsively tried to apply this 
model to the crisis in question, only to discover its 
limits. In other words, though the Syrian crisis is 
centrally responsible for the present shape of Turkish-
Russian relations, it is also a unique crisis, and the 
dynamics of these relations are unlikely to be easily 
replicated in other contexts. 
Context 
Russia came to Syria with the lessons learnt from the 
Libya intervention in 2011. There seems to be a near 
consensus among analysts of Russia’s Middle East 
policy about the centrality of the Libyan affair in 
shaping (then-Prime Minister) President Putin’s 
approach to the events that occurred as part of the 
Arab uprisings.1 Russia’s abstention on United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973, 
tabled on 17 March 2011, paved the way for a mili-
tary intervention led by the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and the subsequent toppling of 
the Qaddafi regime in Libya. Russia believes that the 
West misused this resolution for the purpose of 
regime change – a mandate that Russia contended 
was not provided by this resolution. These events 
convinced Russia that a similar scenario should not 
be allowed to occur in Syria. Moreover, Russia also 
 
1 Dmitri Trenin, What Is Russia up to in the Middle East? 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018). 
came to Syria with its “Afghanistan syndrome” in 
mind,2 which was based on a conviction among Rus-
sian elites that the Syrian campaign should not be 
permitted to lead to mission creep and result in a 
quagmire for Russia: Many analysts and decision-
makers in the West, including then-US President 
Barack Obama, believed that it would.3 These two nar-
ratives significantly shaped Russia’s early Syria cam-
paign – including its determination not to get 
involved in the Syrian civil war on the ground except 
for limited engagements. 
In contrast, at the initial stage, Turkey looked at 
the Syrian uprising in 2011 with optimism during the 
early phase of the Arab uprisings, believing that it 
would leave its heavy imprint on the post-Assad poli-
tical order in Syria as well as the new order that was 
to emerge as a result of the Arab uprisings across the 
region. There was a stark difference between the 
Turkish and Russian approaches to Syria: Whereas 
regime change was a red line for Russia, it was the 
most important policy priority for Turkey until ap-
proximately 2015, particularly after Turkey’s initial 
efforts to convince Bashar al-Assad to undertake 
certain reforms had failed. Yet, the developments on 
the ground did not turn out the way Turkey wanted. 
First, with the benefit of hindsight, the US commit-
ment to regime change in Syria appeared to be half-
hearted at best. Second, with the emergence of the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), for many 
actors, particularly Western ones, the priority in Syria 
 
2 Ibid., 64. 
3 “Obama Warns Russia’s Putin of ‘Quagmire’ in Syria”, 
Reuters, 3 October 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
mideast-crisis-syria-airstrikes/obama-warns-russias-putin-of-
quagmire-in-syria-idUSKCN0RW0W220151003 (accessed 8 
September 2020). 
The Syrian Conflict: 
From Russia’s “Afghanistan” 
to Turkey’s “Syria Syndrome” 
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rapidly shifted from regime change to the war on ter-
ror – on ISIS to be precise. Third, when ISIS besieged 
Kobani, a Syrian Kurdish town, from September 2014 
to February 2015 – an episode during which the 
Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) put up a 
fierce fight – the military partnership between the 
YPG and the US Central Command (CENTCOM) was 
born. The more the major powers began to approach 
Syria through the lens of the war on terror, the more 
the YPG gained international prominence and control 
over territory in the northern part of the country 
bordering Turkey. The YPG’s tacit cooperation with 
Damascus, a flexible approach towards regional and 
international powers, including Iran and Russia, and 
the setting-up of governance structures early on in 
the areas that it controlled further facilitated its gains 
during this period. Thus, Turkey has become increas-
ingly concerned about the prospect of having a YPG-
dominated Kurdish belt running along most of its 
border with Syria. Finally, there was the reality of a 
significant Russian presence to the south of Turkey’s 
borders. All these developments engendered a siege 
mentality among Turkey’s political elites around the 
period of 2014–2016. Turkey’s early optimism and 
euphoria have faded away. 
Drivers behind Turkish engagement 
with Russia in Syria 
During the early stages of the Arab uprisings, Turkey 
appeared to be on the winning side, whereas Russia 
was seen to be on the losing side. In this regard, two 
dates are important to demonstrate how the fortunes 
of the Arab uprisings, their proponents, as well as 
their opponents have changed. In 2012, the region 
was believed to be on the verge of a new regional 
order – a proto-regional order was in the making 
through regime changes in several Arab states as a 
result of the waves of protests. The presidents of the 
following countries had either stepped down or were 
toppled or killed: Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia 
in 2011, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt in 2011, Muammar 
Qaddafi of Libya in 2011, and Ali Abdullah Saleh of 
Yemen in 2012. The collapse of the Assad regime in 
Syria was also seen as imminent in Turkey. This pos-
sibility boosted Turkey’s confidence and belief that 
the region was on the verge of a new order. In this 
scenario, Turkey regarded Russia and Iran as being on 
the losing side of the regional transformation. 
Yet, this picture dramatically changed in 2013. 
Domestically – from the Gezi Park protests, which 
started in late May of that year, to the power struggle 
between the government and the Gülenists,4 which 
fully came to the surface in December of the same 
year and then culminated in a coup attempt on 
15 July 2016 – a series of events ruptured the govern-
ment’s confidence and rendered it more inward-
looking. Regionally, on 3 July 2013, a bloody coup 
ousted Egypt’s democratically elected Muslim Brother-
hood-led government;5 in August, the Assad regime 
used chemical weapons with impunity6 – despite 
Obama’s designation of the use of chemical weapons 
as the US red line for military action;7 in Tunisia, the 
Ennahda movement chose accommodation, in 2014, 
with the ancien regime; Libya’s domestic chaos only 
deepened in 2014–2015. 
To put it starkly, if 2012 represented the emer-
gence of a proto-regional order that was Turkey-
friendly, 2013 represented the unravelling of this 
proto-order. Therefore, by the time of the jet incident 
between Turkey and Russia – Turkey shot down a 
Russian jet violating its airspace on 24 November 
 
4 The Gülenists refers to a socio-religious group that pre-
viously had a strong presence within the state structure and 
an extensive international network of businesses as well as 
education, media, and similar organisations. It utilised its 
presence within the state structure to advance the group’s 
agenda. For a long time, particularly during the struggle 
with Turkey’s previous Kemalist establishment, the group 
allied itself with the government – which in return allowed 
the group to further enhance and deepen its presence within 
the state. Later, this alliance fell apart. Utilising primarily 
its presence within the state, the group engaged in a fierce 
power struggle with the government. This process reached a 
climax when the group engineered a coup attempt, which 
failed, to topple the government on 15 July 2016. Currently, 
the group is designated as a terrorist organisation in Turkey 
and its leader, Fethullah Gülen, is residing in the United 
States – which has become a source of great tension be-
tween Turkey and the United States. 
5 David Kirkpatrick, “Army Ousts Egypt’s President; Morsi 
Is Taken into Military Custody”, The New York Times, 3 July 
2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/ 
egypt.html (accessed 8 September 2020). 
6 Romain Houeix, “A History of the Syria Chemical Weap-
ons ‘Red Line’”, France 24, 14 April 2018, https://www.france 
24.com/en/20180414-syria-chemical-weapons-red-line-obama-
macron-assad-russia-usa-france-idlib (accessed 8 September 
2020). 
7 Ibid. 
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20158 – Turkey’s Syria policy and priorities had al-
ready undergone a major transformation. Instead of 
the narrative of a new regional order in which Turkey 
was supposed to play a leading role as an “order-
instituting actor”,9 as Turkey’s then-Foreign Minister 
Ahmet Davutoğlu would put it, in this new period, 
the language of national security and security threats 
dominated Turkey’s Syria policy. In other words, this 
series of events magnified Turkey’s sense of national 
insecurity. 
Russia’s cooperation with Turkey 
gave more international legitimacy to 
the Russian-designed Astana and 
Sochi processes. 
The jet crisis and ensuing aftermath demonstrated 
how isolated and fragile Turkey’s position in Syria 
had become and how essential it was for Turkey to 
engage with Russia if it wanted to affect the course of 
events on the ground. Thus, Turkey’s understanding 
that it could only re-enter the Syrian scene as a result 
of a deal with Russia – coupled with the apparent 
Russian calculation that it could design both the 
course of the conflict and the political process more 
effectively by way of engagement with Turkey – 
formed the background for the rapprochement be-
tween the two actors. To put it briefly, Turkey’s 
discontent with the Syria policy of the US (including 
the increasingly growing gap between both actors’ 
threat perceptions), the prioritisation of rolling back 
Syrian Kurdish gains over the toppling of the Assad 
regime, and the primacy of Russia in north-western 
Syria (the site of two out of Turkey’s three military 
operations into Syria) motivated Turkey to seek a 
cooperative framework with Russia to address its 
aspirations. Similarly, given that Turkey was one of 
the major backers of the Syrian opposition, Russia’s 
cooperation with Turkey gave more international 
legitimacy to the Russian-designed Astana and Sochi 
processes on the Syrian imbroglio. Likewise, through 
cooperation with Turkey in Syria, Russia forged over-
all closer relations with Turkey, which in return 
 
8 “Turkey’s Downing of Russian Warplane – What We 
Know”, BBC News, 1 December 2015, https://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
news/world-middle-east-34912581 (accessed 8 September 
2020). 
9 Ahmet Davutoglu, “Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy 
and Regional Political Structuring”, Turkey Policy Brief Series 
(TEPAV, 2012). 
drove further wedges between Turkey and the US and 
created discontent within NATO. 
Mechanism of cooperation and 
competition in Syria 
With this awareness, Turkey and Russia mended their 
ties in mid-2016 to set aside the tension that had 
ensued from the jet incident – this incident reduced 
the room for manoeuvre by Turkey and its allied 
Syrian opposition groups in the Syrian theatre. In 
this respect, Moscow’s early stance against the coup 
attempt in Turkey on 15 July 2016 significantly 
changed the nature of their relations for the better. 
Less than 40 days after the coup attempt, Turkey 
launched its first cross-border operation into Syria – 
the Euphrates Shield operation – with Russia’s 
blessing.10 Focusing on the ISIS-run areas between 
Jarablus, Azaz, and al-Bab in north-western Syria, the 
most immediate objective of this operation was to 
clear Turkey’s border of ISIS – the immediate opera-
tional goal of this military offensive. However, by 
taking over al-Bab, this operation also prevented the 
Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) from 
creating complete territorial contiguity between its 
three different cantons in northern Syria (preventing 
the then PYD-run Afrin region in north-west Syria 
from being territorially merged with the PYD’s en-
claves in north-east Syria)11 – this formed the stra-
tegic goal of the same operation. Likewise, with 
Moscow’s green light, Ankara launched another 
military offensive against the PYD-YPG in Afrin on 
20 January 2018.12 With this operation, Turkey took 
over Afrin and almost completely terminated the 
PYD-YPG’s presence in the north-western part of Syria 
– except for small pockets of Tel Rifat and Manbij. 
Russia’s facilitation of Turkey’s re-entry onto the 
Syrian scene, thereby enabling Ankara to attain its 
operational and strategic goals, incentivised Turkey to 
take part in Russia-engineered processes concerning 
Syria. In return, Turkey’s participation legitimised the 
 
10 “Turkey Ends ‘Euphrates Shield’ Operation in Syria”, 
Al Jazeera, 30 March 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/ 
2017/3/30/turkey-ends-euphrates-shield-operation-in-syria 
(accessed 10 September 2020). 
11 Galip Dalay, What Next for Turkey in Syria? (Doha: 
Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 27 March 2017). 
12 “Syria: Turkey War Planes Launch Strikes on Afrin”, 
BBC News, 20 January 2018, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ 
world-middle-east-42759944 (accessed 10 September 2020). 
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Russian-led initiatives (Astana and Sochi processes). 
This participation has also reduced the burden and 
costs of the civil war for Russia, as these processes 
restructured the war in a way that made it easier for 
the Assad regime to recover more territories from the 
opposition with relatively low cost. In this respect, on 
20 December 2016, the foreign ministers of Turkey, 
Russia, and Iran met in Moscow to launch a trilateral 
process on Syria, which later came to be dubbed the 
Astana process.13 Through this trilateral setting, 
the three actors held 14 rounds of meetings within 
the framework of the Astana process before later con-
vening the Sochi conference on the political process 
in Syria on January 30, 2018.14 Apart from this trilat-
eral framework, when it comes to the different sets of 
disputes over Idlib province, Moscow and Ankara 
have usually operated within a bilateral framework, 
leaving Iran out for the most part. In other words, 
in the case of Idlib, the Astana trio has been largely 
replaced by the Astana duo. Therefore, Turkish-
Russian engagements in Syria have occurred through 
structured trilateral and bilateral processes. 
Despite these cooperative frameworks, Turkish-
Russian policies in Syria have remained inherently 
competitive and prone to conflict – both actors 
support different sides in the conflict. In addition, 
Russia wants the Assad regime to establish control 
over as much of Syria as possible, ideally all of Syria, 
whereas Turkey’s presence in Syria increasingly ap-
pears to be long-term, not temporary. Plus, according 
to the Sochi Accord of 2018 between Moscow and 
Ankara, Turkey was supposed to deal with the ques-
tion of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – a group com-
posed of former Syrian al-Qaeda members that was 
designated as a terrorist organisation by the United 
Nations (UN) – and force it to withdraw from the 
areas that it controls in Idlib. Turkey has thus far 
failed to honour this pledge. Moreover, instead of 
counter-terrorism, Ankara appears to be pursuing a 
de-radicalisation and transformation agenda with this 
group. Neither side, but particularly Russia, has shied 
away from drawing red lines when their interests 
were being threatened. The most obvious case in 
 
13 “Astana Joint Statement by Iran, Russia, Turkey: in 
Full”, Al Jazeera, 24 January 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/ 
news/2017/1/24/astana-joint-statement-by-iran-russia-turkey-
in-full (accessed 10 September 2020). 
14 Anne Bernard, “Syrian Peace Talks in Russia: 1,500 
Delegates, Mostly Pro-Assad”, The New York Times, 30 January 
2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/30/world/middleeast/ 
syria-russia-sochi-talks.html (accessed 10 September 2020). 
point was when the Russia-Syria regime killed 36 
Turkish soldiers on 28 February 2020 during the 
confrontation over Idlib.15 During these flare-ups, 
there have been clear patterns in the policies of both 
Russia and Turkey. First, both actors have pursued a 
policy of military consolidation (or driving up costs 
for the other side) on the ground. Second, these 
escalatory cycles were then de-escalated through 
Erdoğan-Putin summitries. These summitries culmi-
nated in new deals or what can be regarded as cease-
fire politics, and hence new shaky status quos, which 
were easily breached during subsequent confronta-
tions. This illustrates the “fragility and flexibility”16 
or the testing and sustaining dynamics of Turkish-
Russian engagements in Syria and beyond – in the 
sense that the incompatibilities of Turkish and Rus-
sian aspirations and interests have rendered their 
ties fragile. However, they have illustrated sufficient 
flexibility and agility in managing these incompati-
bilities (hence the fragility of their relations), culmi-
nating in the crumbling of ties. 
Finally, Russia has maintained an overall upper 
hand in its engagement with Turkey in Syria. There 
are three factors that have worked in favour of Russia 
in the context of Syria and created asymmetry in 
Moscow-Ankara relations there: Russia’s military 
superiority, the long Turkish border with Syria 
(vulnerability to the refugee influx), and the Kurds 
(Turkey’s Achilles heel). 
Implications 
As put forward above, Russia directly facilitated 
Turkey’s two military offensives (Operation Euphrates 
Shield August 2016–March 2017 and the Afrin 
Operation January–March 2018) into Syria and in-
directly facilitated the third.17 
 
15 “Erdoğan açıkladı: İdlib’de şehit sayısı 36’a yükseldi” 
[Erdoğan Announced: The Number of Our Martyrs Rose to 
36], Karar Gazetesi (a liberal conservative daily), 29 February 
2020, https://www.karar.com/erdogan-acikladi-idlibde-sehit-
sayisi-36a-yukseldi-1546876 (accessed 11 September 2020). 
16 See Maxim Suchkov, “Russia and Turkey: Flexible 
Rivals” (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 20 March 2020), 
https://carnegie.ru/commentary/81330 (accessed 11 Septem-
ber 2020); also, see, Charles Thépaut, The Astana Process: 
A Flexible but Fragile Showcase for Russia, Policy Analysis 
(The Washington Institute, 28 April 2020). 
17 To clarify, once Turkey pushed the PYD/YPG from the 
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Moreover, both the Astana and Sochi processes 
are essentially premised on a Russian-Turkish under-
standing with Iranian participation. Given Turkey’s 
status as the main sponsor of the Syrian opposition, 
its presence gave legitimacy and international accep-
tance to these processes. Yet, these processes have 
effectively reflected Russia’s reading of the crisis and 
its vision for the solution. Through Astana, Russia has 
cut the connections between a ceasefire, de-escala-
tion, and the political process.18 Likewise, through the 
Sochi conference, it seems that Russia (as well as the 
regime and Iran) has cut the link between the poli-
tical process and a political transition.19 Instead, the 
political process is conceived of as including some 
fine-tuning to the regime’s 2012 constitution as well 
as preparatory work for a sham electoral process.20 
The net loser of these processes is the Syrian opposi-
tion. During the Astana and Sochi processes, the 
opposition has increasingly come to be seen as Tur-
key’s proxy – Turkey’s deployment of Syrian fighters 
in Libya was an important demonstration in this 
respect (Russia similarly deployed the pro-regime 
Syrian fighters to fight on behalf of the Libyan 
National Army (LNA) – which in return has reduced 
their legitimacy, both among the Syrian population 
 
Shield and Afrin operations, Ankara then further increased 
its pressure on the United States to greenlight its military 
offensive into north-eastern Syria. Certainly, Donald Trump, 
as a person, has enabled Turkey’s operation. However, if 
Turkey would not have already pushed the YPG from the 
north-western part of Syria, it is unlikely that it would have 
then prioritised the launch of an operation against the 
YPG/PYD in north-eastern Syria – for a long time Ankara 
was fixated on the presence of the YPG/PYD in the north-
western part of the country. Therefore, it was the idea of 
“mission accomplished” in north-western Syria that enabled 
Turkey to turn its firepower onto north-eastern Syria. 
18 Galip Dalay, “From Astana to Sochi: How De-escalation 
Allowed Assad to Return to War”, The Middle East Eye, 
20 February 2018, https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/ 
astana-sochi-how-de-escalation-allowed-assad-return-war 
(accessed 13 September 2020). 
19 Ibid. 
20 “Rocky Syria Talks in Russia End, Ignore Key Opposition 
Demands”, Reuters, 30 January 2018, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-
congress/rocky-syria-talks-in-russia-end-ignore-key-
opposition-demands-idUSKBN1FJ0WJ (accessed 13 September 
2020); “A Disappointing Gathering in Sochi”, The Jordan 
Times, 31 January 2018, 
http://www.jordantimes.com/opinion/editorial/disappointing-
gathering-sochi (accessed 13 September 2020). 
as well as internationally. The other group that can 
be described as a relative loser is the Syrian Kurdish 
YPG. Through its engagement with Russia and par-
ticipation in Russia-led processes, Turkey has been 
able to return onto the Syrian scene, undertake its 
Euphrates Shield and Afrin operations, and create a 
Turkish-controlled zone in the north-western part of 
Syria – and, with Moscow’s indirect, enabling role, 
a limited zone in north-eastern Syria. In other words, 
through the Astana and Sochi processes, Turkish-
Russian engagements in Syria have restructured the 
war in a way that has led to the Syrian opposition 
losing legitimacy and territory and the Assad regime 
recovering more territory. Turkey attained some of 
its major goals, particularly vis-à-vis the Syrian Kurd-
ish PYD, and Russia emerged as the primary power 
broker in the country. To illustrate the magnitude of 
the opposition’s loss: Of the four de-escalation zones 
– Eastern Ghouta, Homs, Daraa, and Idlib – that 
were established as part of the Astana process in May 
2017 and designed to be zones in which all hostilities 
were to cease – only one (Idlib) exists today.21 And 
this one is also under heavy pressure from the regime 
and the Russians. 
Moscow-Ankara-Tehran 
cooperation in Syria has largely 
come at the expense of the West’s 
role and influence there. 
Corollary to this, Russian-Turkish engagement in 
Syria has had spillover effects on other areas, hence 
paving the way for the deepening of overall bilateral 
relations. The most obvious case in point is Turkey’s 
purchase of Russian S-400 missile systems in 2017.22 
It is unlikely that Turkey would have bought these 
missile systems in the absence of Moscow-Ankara 
cooperation in Syria. This purchase has become one 
of the major points of friction between Turkey and 
the US. In fact, the US has removed Turkey from the 
F-35 fighter jet programme in response.23 Likewise, 
through Syria, Moscow and Ankara have undergone a 
 
21 Gregor Jaecke and David Labude, De-escalation Zones in 
Syria, Country Report (Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, June 2020). 
22 “Turkey Signs Deal to Get Russian S-400 Air Defence 
Missiles”, BBC News, 12 September 2017, https://www.bbc.co. 
uk/news/world-europe-41237812 (accessed 13 September 
2020). 
23 “US Removes Turkey from F-35 Fighter Jet Programme”, 
BBC News, 17 July 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-
canada-49023115 (accessed 13 September 2020). 
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learning process. Whenever there has been a conflict 
in which both actors are involved, they have explored 
ways to see whether they can apply their Syria expe-
rience – or learning processes from this experience 
– to the new contexts. They tried this for the Libyan 
conflict, though less successfully and skilfully. Simi-
larly, Turkey has tried to initiate an Astana-style 
bilateral track with Russia on the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict,24 yet the Russians have rebuffed this out-
reach by Turkey. 
Finally, Turkish-Russian cooperation in Syria has 
helped both sides to achieve some of their major goals 
and aspirations as well as increase their influence and 
ability – along with that of Iran – in charting the 
course of the civil war. In return, this has decreased 
the role and influence of the Western powers in 
Syria. Similarly, the Astana and Sochi processes have 
hollowed out the UN-led and Western-supported 
Geneva process – however, as the Astana process has 
largely run its course by now, the Geneva track might 
regain more relevance for the political process. To 
give an example, through the Astana process, Russia 
has largely taken the de-escalation subject off the 
table in Geneva.25 Thus, Moscow-Ankara-Tehran 
cooperation in Syria has largely come at the expense 




24 “Turkey Ready to Work with Russia for Karabakh Peace: 
Erdoğan”, Hurriyet Daily News, 23 October 2020, https://www. 
hurriyetdailynews.com/erdogan-hopes-to-work-with-russia-
in-nagorno-karabakh-solution-159404 (accessed 16 December 
2020). 
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After Syria, the second regional context in which 
Turkey and Russia explored a structured engagement 
was the Libyan imbroglio. Unlike in Syria – where 
Russia has maintained an overall upper hand with 
Turkey – in Libya, there was no such asymmetry in 
relations. Turkey’s level of vulnerability vis-à-vis sus-
ceptibility to Russia was relatively low. In addition, as 
Russia often points out, there is a formal invitation 
by the UN-recognised Syrian regime to legitimise its 
presence in Syria. Turkey utilised a similar justifica-
tion for its presence in Libya, which came at the 
behest of the UN-recognised Government of National 
Accord (GNA).26 However, Turkish-Russian engage-
ment in Libya was limited, both in terms of scope and 
duration. 
Context 
Libya was the first Arab Spring country where up-
risings became militarised, leading to a UN-authorised 
NATO intervention in Libya.27 Initially, Turkey vocally 
opposed it.28 However, once it began to see the West-
ern intervention as inevitable, it quickly changed its 
position and supported it. In fact, Ankara then saw 
the benefit that it would have a say in the decision-
making process of a NATO intervention, as opposed to 
 
26 For a view on how Turkey’s Libya policy is inspired by 
Russia’s playbook in Syria, see Tarek Megerisi, “It’s Turkey’s 
Libya Now”, European Council on Foreign Relations, 20 May 2020, 
https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_its_turkeys_libya_now/ 
(accessed 7 November 2020). 
27 Tarek Megerisi, “How Libya Became a Battleground for 
Foreign Powers”, Newlines Magazine, 11 October 2020, 
https://newlinesmag.com/argument/how-libya-became-a-
battleground-for-foreign-powers/ (accessed 7 November 
2020). 
28 Saban Kardas, “Turkey on NATO’s Role in the MENA: 
Perspectives from a ‘Central Country’” (Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012). 
a French-British-US intervention, in which it would 
have had either limited or no say. Similarly, Russia’s 
abstention on UNSC Resolution 1973 provided UN 
legitimacy for the NATO mission that toppled the 
Qaddafi regime. At this stage, both Ankara and Mos-
cow consented to what was essentially a Western 
policy on Libya. Ankara, in particular, tried to jump 
on the bandwagon and align itself with this Western 
policy of regime change in Tripoli. 
However since the toppling of the Qaddafi regime, 
the appetites of both the US and Europe for engage-
ments in Libya have significantly decreased.29 That 
opened the way for other actors to fill the vacuum 
and for the civil wars to become more perilous, as the 
country was beset with uncontrolled militia violence. 
In 2015, with temporary Western re-engagement, the 
UN brokered the Libyan Political Agreement, which 
gave birth to the UN-recognised GNA.30 But this did 
not end the civil war or the belief in a military solu-
tion to the conflict held by actors such as the LNA of 
self-styled Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar. In fact soon 
afterwards, the country was effectively divided be-
tween the Tripoli-based GNA and the Tobruk-based 
House of Representatives, which is largely controlled 
by the LNA. Aided by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), and Russia, and believing in a military solution 
and total victory, the LNA launched a military offen-
sive in April 2019 to take over Tripoli and control the 
whole of Libya. As the LNA gained ground, it was 
not only the GNA, but also Turkey’s Libya policy that 
faced the moment of truth. Inaction would have spelt 
 
29 See Wolfram Lacher’s comment for Radio Free Europe & 
Radio Liberty, Frud Bezhan, “U.S. Vacuum: How Libya Is 
Descending into a Russia-Turkey Proxy War”, Radio Free 
Europe & Radio Liberty, 21 January 2020, https://www.rferl.org/ 
a/u-s-vacuum-how-libya-is-descending-into-a-russia-turkey-
proxy-war-/30389900.html (accessed 8 November 2020). 
30 Megerisi, “How Libya Became a Battleground for Foreign 
Powers” (see note 27). 
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defeat both for the GNA and Turkey’s policy – it 
would have been a major blow for Turkey’s standing 
in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Maghreb. In 
response, Turkey decided to undertake a forceful 
intervention to protect the GNA and its broader inter-
ests in late 2019. 
Drivers behind Turkey’s active role and 
quest for engagement with Russia 
Turkey’s goals for its decisive Libyan intervention and 
policy are multifold. Financially, Turkish companies 
(particularly construction firms) were highly active 
during the Qaddafi era in Libya31 – for instance, 
prior to 2011, there were around 25,000 Turkish 
workers in Libya.32 There are many frozen contracts 
from this era. The question of who controls Tripoli is 
decisive, particularly as to whether Turkey will get 
these contracts and payments. On top of this, Ankara 
also covets a share of Libya’s future reconstruction, 
including a presence in the country’s energy and 
financial sectors. Moreover, the regional political and 
geopolitical divides that were born out of the Arab 
Spring are on full display in Libya, where Turkey is 
engaged in a fierce rivalry with the anti-Arab Spring 
forces such as the UAE, Egypt, and to a lesser degree 
Saudi Arabia. Plus, Libya is also the site of a geopoliti-
cal confrontation between Turkey and France, as 
both actors support different sides in the conflict – 
whereas Turkey supports the GNA, France supports 
the LNA and projects influence in Libya, the Mediter-
ranean, and North Africa. Through its Libya policy, 
Ankara is trying not to lose ground in these multi-
layered power struggles.33 Plus, Turkey sees the 
Libyan imbroglio as part of a broader power play and 
geopolitical rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean.34 
 
31 Ece Goksedef, “Libya, Türkiye’nin yeni dış politika 
önceliği haline mi geliyor?” [Is Libya Becoming the New 
Priority of Turkish Foreign Policy?], BBC Türkçe (BBC’s Turkish 
service), 3 July 2019, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-
dunya-48844835 (accessed 8 November 2020). 
32 Ibid. 
33 Galip Dalay, “Turkey’s Libya Gambit Is Paying Off – 
for Now”, Middle East Eye, 19 May 2020, https://www.middle 
easteye.net/opinion/turkeys-libya-gambit-paying-now 
(accessed 8 November 2020). 
34 Galip Dalay, “Libya Conflict: Turkey Is Looking for 
a ‘Third Way’ in Sirte”, Middle East Eye, 21 July 2020, 
https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/libya-conflict-turkey--
options- (accessed 8 November 2020). 
In recent years, Ankara has felt that a new energy 
and security order is emerging in this region, an order 
that is centred on close cooperation between Egypt, 
Israel, Greece, and Cyprus, and from which Turkey is 
excluded. With its Libya policy, Turkey is trying to 
disrupt and undermine this emerging framework. 
Centred on Greece, Cyprus, Israel, and Egypt, it 
gained institutional form in January 2020 with the 
creation of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum in 
Cairo – deepening Turkey’s sense of exclusion from 
this emerging framework. Even worse for Turkey, 
there have been a growing number of voices from 
within the US establishment advocating that the US 
support this new framework.35 This has caused un-
ease and consternation in Ankara and, moreover, 
further convinced Turkish policy-makers that the US 
is engaged in a soft-containment policy of Turkey in 
this region. This, in return, has further contributed to 
the belief in Ankara that Turkey has to operate as a 
less risk-averse actor while exercising more hard 
power and taking a more heavy-handed approach in 
order to protect its interests in this region. Turkey’s 
Libya policy is a manifestation of precisely this 
thinking. 
In a similar vein, through its heightened role in 
the Libyan conflict, Russia is gaining additional 
sources of leverage and influence vis-à-vis Europe, as 
its grip over a major refugee gateway to Europe is 
strengthening. Likewise, the more that Russian mili-
tary involvement in Libya has increased, the more 
Moscow has gained additional sources of influence 
over the pro-LNA and pro-Haftar Arab countries such 
as the UAE, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia – Russia has 
shown aptitude in materialising its geopolitical 
influence in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region. Turkey’s increasing military role in Libya has 
relatively heightened Russia’s importance for these 
Arab states as a countervailing force. Plus, Russia’s 
Libya campaign is strengthening its position in East-
ern Mediterranean geopolitics, which is an increas-
ingly important sub-region for European security 
and a major flashpoint of regional geopolitics in the 
 
35 In fact, the bi-partisan bill for the “Eastern Mediterrane-
an security and energy partnership of 2019” (East Med Act), 
which was tabled jointly by Senators Robert Menendez 
(Democrat, New Jersey) and Marco Rubio (Republican, 
Florida) was approved by the Senate and signed into law by 
US President Donald Trump as part of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for 2020. This bill commits the US to 
support the emerging energy and security architecture in 
the Eastern Mediterranean. 
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MENA region and the Mediterranean. In addition, 
through its role, Russia also covets a share of Libya’s 
financial, energy, and reconstruction pie. 
There were key developments for Turkish-Russian 
relations in Libya that took place in 2019. In April 
2019, Haftar’s LNA launched an offensive to take over 
Tripoli from the GNA, a crucial ally to Turkey.36 This 
offensive was fully supported by the UAE, Egypt, and 
Russia. As Haftar was making major advances, the 
GNA’s search for regional and international support 
became more desperate, and yet unsuccessful. Faced 
with the danger of the GNA falling, which would 
have removed Turkey from the Libyan scene and 
undermined its interests not only in Libya, but also 
in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey stepped in to 
scale-up its military support to the GNA. To that 
effect, Turkey signed two memorandums of under-
standing with the GNA in November 2019:37 the 
“delimitation of maritime jurisdiction areas” in the 
Mediterranean Sea, and a security and military coop-
eration agreement. With the former, Turkey sought 
to disrupt the emerging security and energy frame-
work in the Eastern Mediterranean, while with the 
latter, Ankara effectively committed itself to the 
protection of the GNA, upon which Turkey believes 
its interests in Libya rest. Operationalising this com-
mitment, Turkey undertook direct military deploy-
ment in support of the GNA, including providing 
military equipment (particularly armed drones) and 
recruiting and transferring Syrian fighters to Libya 
to fight on behalf of the GNA. The goal of this policy 
was to prevent the fall of the GNA, balance the deter-
rence on the ground, and pave the way for a political 
process, which Turkey and the GNA would enter from 
a position of strength. 
These factors motivated Turkey to scale-up its 
profile in the Libyan imbroglio. Another set of factors 
incentivised Turkey to engage with Russia to explore 
ways to chart the course of the Libyan conflict. 
First, the learning experiences that Turkey and 
Russia have acquired in Syria through the Astana and 
Sochi processes as well as by way of the multiple 
 
36 “Libya Crisis: Clashes Erupt South of Capital Tripoli”, 
BBC News, 20 April 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
africa-48000672 (accessed 10 November 2020). 
37 “The Libya-Turkey Memorandum of Understanding: 
Local and Regional Repercussions” (Washington, DC: Arab 
Centre, ACRPS Unit for Policy Studies, 2 January 2020), 
http://arabcenterdc.org/policy_analyses/the-libya-turkey-
memorandum-of-understanding-local-and-regional-
repercussions/ (accessed 10 November 2020). 
bilateral deals on Idlib have made them more in-
clined to seek similar engagements in Libya. In 
addition, the fact that both countries have increased 
their military and political footprints in the country, 
particularly towards the end of 2019, coupled with 
the good rapport and chemistry between Putin and 
Erdoğan, have further reinforced this inclination for 
engagements. 
Second, the unwillingness of the US to get involved 
deeper, coupled with the disunity of the European 
powers in Libya – particularly the divide between 
France and Italy – has increased the prominence of 
the UAE, Egypt, Russia, and Turkey in the conflict. 
Along these same lines, Turkey was unhappy with the 
multiple European diplomatic attempts to resolve 
the conflict, such as the Paris and Palermo confer-
ences on Libya in 2018. Turkey believed that these 
European initiatives were not taking its interests into 
account sufficiently. As a sign of its displeasure with 
the Italian diplomatic effort, Turkey withdrew from 
the Palermo Conference of 2018 on Libya38 after it 
emerged that Egypt was trying to convene a meeting 
on the subject within the framework of the Palermo 
Conference, which did not include Turkey, nor did it 
feature in the official agenda of the event (according 
to the Turkish side).39 The relative absence of the US, 
the disunity of the Europeans (including Turkey’s 
discontent with their policies) on Libya, and the 
power struggle with the UAE and Egypt has rendered 
Russia the most convenient actor for Ankara to 
engage with, despite the competitive nature of their 
interests and aspirations. 
 
38 Enis Gunaydin, “Türkiye Libya konferansından çekildi: 
Krizin arka planı” [Turkey Withdrew from the Conference on 
Libya: The Background to the Crisis], Euronews, 13 November 
2018, https://tr.euronews.com/2018/11/13/libya-da-istikrar-
isteyen-rakip-liderler-italya-da-zirvede-bulusuyor (accessed 
11 November 2020). 
39 Emrah Kekilli, “Palermo Konferansı’ndan Türkiye heyeti 
neden döndü?” [Why Did the Turkish Delegation Withdraw 
from the Palermo Conference?], Sabah (a pro-government 
daily), 17 November 2019, https://www.sabah.com.tr/ 
yazarlar/perspektif/emrah-kekilli/2018/11/17/palermo-
konferansindan-turkiye-heyeti-neden-dondu (accessed 
11 November 2020). 
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Mechanism of cooperation and 
competition in Libya 
Before there was any diplomatic engagement between 
Moscow and Ankara on Libya, both sides sought to 
change the military map of the conflict and military 
consolidation on the ground. In particular, after 
Turkey signed two memorandums of understanding 
with the GNA in November 2019, and after the Tur-
kish Parliament authorised40 the deployment of 
Turkish forces to Libya on 2 January 2020, Turkey 
significantly ratcheted up its military support to the 
GNA. It especially sought to establish the aerial 
superiority around Tripoli first, and then other parts 
of western Libya. As a result of this policy, the mili-
tary dynamics on the ground have changed consider-
ably in favour of the GNA. 
These military changes have become particularly 
more apparent since April 2020. With the capture of 
cities in western Libya, such as the important coastal 
cities of Sabratha, Surman, and Al-Ajaylat,41 the 
strategic al-Watiya airbase42 (which was in the hands 
of fighters loyal to Haftar since 2014), and Tarhuna,43 
the GNA had almost established complete control 
over western Libya. The GNA’s military gains, how-
ever, did not deter Russia. In contrast, Russia, along 
with other external backers of the LNA, doubled 
down on its military presence in the country, flying 
fighter jets to Libya via Syria.44 Therefore, before their 
diplomatic engagements, both sides sought military 
reinforcements on the ground and criticised each 
 
40 Zia Weise, “Turkish Parliament Approves Troop De-
ployment to Libya”, Politico, 2 January 2020, https://www. 
politico.eu/article/turkish-parliament-approves-troop-
deployment-to-libya/ (accessed 12 November 2020). 
41 “Libya: Tripoli Gov’t Retakes Three Cities from Haftar’s 
Forces”, Al Jazeera, 14 April 2020, https://www.aljazeera. 
com/news/2020/4/14/libya-tripoli-govt-retakes-three-cities-
from-haftars-forces (accessed 12 November 2020). 
42 Patrick Wintour, “UN-backed Libyan Forces Take Key 
Airbase from Rebel General”, The Guardian, 18 May 2020, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/18/forces-
allied-to-libyan-government-retake-key-al-watiya-airbase 
(accessed 12 November 2020). 
43 “Libyan Government Forces Seize Haftar Stronghold 
Tarhuna”, Al Jazeera, 5 June 2020, https://www.aljazeera. 
com/news/2020/6/5/libyan-government-forces-seize-haftar-
stronghold-tarhuna (accessed 12 November 2020). 
44 “Russia Deploys Military Fighter Aircraft to Libya”, 
U.S. Africa Command Public Affairs, 26 May 2020, https://www. 
africom.mil/pressrelease/32887/russia-deploys-military-
fighter-aircraft-to-l (accessed 12 November 2020). 
other’s Libya policy – whereas Ankara criticised45 
the presence of the Russian private security firm the 
Wagner group, Moscow problematised Turkey’s 
deployment of Syrian mercenaries in Libya, even 
though Moscow itself recruited Syrian fighters from 
the regime-controlled areas to fight on behalf of the 
LNA in Libya.46 
In parallel to these military consolidation strategies 
on the ground, Moscow and Ankara have explored 
ways to launch a bilateral process that would aim to 
redesign not only the conflict maps, but also the 
political parameters of a resolution process as well. In 
fact, prior to the Berlin Conference of 19 January 
2020,47 Moscow and Ankara sped up their efforts to 
broker a deal on Libya. On 8 January 2020, Putin and 
Erdoğan called48 for a ceasefire in Libya. To follow up 
on this call, Turkey and Russia attempted to broker a 
ceasefire between the GNA and LNA, however this 
effort bore no results after Haftar left Moscow with-
out signing the ceasefire agreement on 14 January.49 
Had their efforts proved to be successful, that would 
have partially hollowed out the Berlin Conference – 
similar to how the Astana and Sochi processes hol-
lowed out the Geneva process on the Syrian conflict. 
Implications and projections 
Despite this failure to launch a bilateral process in 
Libya, Ankara and Moscow have not given up 
 
45 “Pointing to Russian Mercenaries, Turkey’s Erdoğan 
Weighs Joining Fight in Libya”, The Moscow Times, 12 Decem-
ber 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/12/12/ 
pointing-to-russian-mercenaries-turkeys-erdogan-weighs-
joining-fight-in-libya-a68600 (accessed 12 November 2020). 
46 “Exclusive: 2,000 Syrian Fighters Deployed to Libya to 
Support Government”, The Guardian, 15 January 2020, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/15/exclusive-
2000-syrian-troops-deployed-to-libya-to-support-regime 
(accessed 12 November 2020). 
47 “The Berlin Conference on Libya: Conference Conclu-
sions”, Press Release no. 31 (The Press and Information Office 
of the Federal Government, Germany, 19 January 2020), 
https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/the-berlin-
conference-on-libya-1713882 (accessed 12 November 2020). 
48 “Libya Conflict: Turkey and Russia Call for Ceasefire”, 
BBC News, 8 January 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
africa-51033277 (accessed 12 November 2020). 
49 “Libya Peace Talks in Moscow Fall Short of Ceasefire 
Deal”, Reuters, 13 January 2020, https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-libya-security-russia-idUSKBN1ZC0AE (accessed 
12 November 2020). 
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completely on their military consolidation on the 
ground, nor on their bilateral diplomatic engage-
ments on approaches to Libya. Especially their mili-
tary strategies have yielded results on the ground. 
Since the Berlin Conference, two new trends have 
increasingly become clear. First, Haftar has been sig-
nificantly weakened militarily, and his hope of taking 
over Tripoli has been dashed – a major victory for 
Turkey’s military campaign in this war-torn coun-
try.50 Second, Russia has arguably emerged as the 
primus inter pares among Haftar’s external backers – 
which includes, apart from Russia, the UAE, Egypt, 
France, and Saudi Arabia. Both of these developments 
have been advantageous for Turkey. The rationale for 
the former development is clear. When it comes to 
the latter, of all of Haftar’s backers, Russia is the one 
that Turkey has developed a working relationships 
with, both cooperatively and competitively, in recent 
years. 
The anti-Russia posture 
of the US in Libya serves 
Turkish interests. 
However, in spite of these positive trends, there are 
limits to any Turkish-Russian engagement on Libya. 
The military effectiveness of each on the ground is 
unlikely to translate into corresponding bilateral 
diplomatic effectiveness on the crisis for several rea-
sons. First, in Syria: Putting aside the US, the Astana 
trio of Turkey, Russia, and Iran are the only external 
players with a capacity to change the military 
dynamics on the ground in any significant manner. 
In contrast, in Libya, there are more regional and 
international players that can undermine any 
Turkish-Russian bilateral deal on the conflict, and 
hence more spoilers. Therefore, even if there are 
more Turkish-Russian declarations or roadmaps to be 
announced over Libya in the coming period, these 
declarations will not amount to what can be de-
scribed as an Astana process for Libya, one that can 
design the political and military map of the conflict 
in Libya in the same way the original Astana process 
did in Syria. Second, Turkey will continue with its 
double-track policy with the US and Russia on Libya. 
In this respect, the anti-Russia posture of the US in 
 
50 Declan Walsh, “In Stunning Reversal, Turkey Emerges 
As Libya Kingmaker”, The New York Times, 21 May 2020, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/21/world/middleeast/libya-
turkey-russia-hifter.html (accessed 14 November 2020). 
Libya serves Turkish interests. Plus, Ankara does not 
have any major point of friction with Washington 
regarding Libya as it does with Syria (over the Kurdish 
PYD/YPG). Unless, there is a policy revision in the US 
on Libya that Ankara might find inimical to its inter-
ests, Turkey will be careful not to antagonise the US 
– especially given the interconnection between the 
Libyan crisis and the power play between Turkey 
and a set of countries in the Eastern Mediterranean, 
where additional US support for the anti-Turkey 
camp could make a difference. Therefore, while Tur-
key is engaging with Russia on Libya, it also wants to 
capitalise on the spectre of Russia’s growing influence 
on Europe’s doorstep to lobby for Western support 
for its position, particularly the support of the US. 
Instead of trying to attain its goals through bilat-
eral engagements with Russia, at present, Turkey is 
trying to achieve these goals through military con-
solidation on the ground and diplomatic flexibility. 
In terms of military dynamics, it appears that Sirte, 
the gate to the oil crescent in Libya, has become a 
new dividing line between the GNA’s and the LNA’s 
areas of control and the Turkish-Russian (and for that 
matter Egypt’s and the UAE’s) spheres of influence. It 
therefore appears that Turkish-GNA military momen-
tum has run out of steam. At this stage, Turkey will 
focus on the consolidation of its presence and 
influence in the area that the GNA controls and on 
translating military gains into political, economic, 
and strategic gains as much as – and as soon as – 
possible. To that effect, Ankara has signed a plethora 
of agreements with the GNA in the areas of economy, 
finance, energy, business, and security – whether or 
not most of these deals will materialise is another 
matter. In any change of government or change in 
the structure or composition of power in Libya, Tur-
key will certainly strive to make sure that the agree-
ments that it has signed with the GNA remain intact. 
Likewise, it will push for its allies to maintain their 
roles and influence in any new power reconfiguration 
in Libya. At the security level, Turkey’s primary con-
cern will be to prevent instability and infighting in 
Tripoli and Misrata. At the strategic level, Turkey will 
continue to upgrade the capacity of its air (al-Watiya) 
and naval (Misrata) bases. On a parallel track, Turkey 
will also double down on its security-sector reform, 
institution-building, and army-building efforts in 
western Libya.51 In this way, Turkey believes that it 
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can institutionalise its influence, and hence ensure 
that its influence remains in the country for the long 
term. However, the lack of a committed international 
ally will be one of Turkey’s major weaknesses. There-
fore, it should not come as a surprise if Turkey ex-
periences a significant gap in results between its 
military gains and its political influence and gains in 
the country down the road. Relatedly, it is plausible 
to anticipate that Turkey’s influence in Libya may 
begin to wane. 
Finally, for most of the Libyan imbroglio, Turkey 
and Russia have been playing the catch-up role, either 
with Western policy or due to developments on the 
ground. In this sense, their policies have been more 
reactive. However, in the latest phase of this conflict, 
both actors have tried to proactively redesign and 
redefine the conflict map, mainly militarily, but 
partially politically as well. And the increase in their 
influence has come at the expense of Western actors 
in the Libyan crisis. 
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Although Nagorno-Karabakh is not situated in the 
MENA region, the crisis there has revealed important 
features about Turkish-Russian engagements in vari-
ous conflict zones throughout the Middle East and 
beyond. First, this crisis has illustrated how different 
subjects and conflicts, irrespective of their geographic 
locations, have become closely intertwined in Ankara-
Moscow relations. Second, this crisis has also shed 
light on how Russia has approached engagements 
with Turkey in the Middle East and the post-Soviet 
space differently in a qualitative manner. 
Context 
On 27 September 2020, fighting broke out between 
two former Soviet republics: Azerbaijan and Armenia 
over Nagorno-Karabakh and its seven surrounding 
areas, which belong to Azerbaijan according to the 
UN, but they have been administered by Armenia 
since the early 1990s. This conflict has put Russia in a 
tight spot, as it is unfolding between Armenia, which 
is a member of the Russia-led Collective Security 
Treaty Organisation, and Azerbaijan, another close 
partner of Moscow. In contrast, Turkey saw an oppor-
tunity to increase its influence in the South Caucasus 
– a region that Ankara sees as being in its immediate 
neighbourhood – through the very same conflict. 
To that effect, Turkey threw its full and active support 
behind Azerbaijan. This support has taken several 
forms. 
At the military level, as Azerbaijan has executed 
heavily dronised warfare, Turkey has been one of the 
major suppliers, alongside Israel, of military hard-
ware and drones to Azerbaijan.52 It is highly likely 
that Turkey has also provided direct technical exper-
tise in operating these drones. Second, Turkey has 
reportedly sent53 Syrian fighters to aid the Azerbaijani 
side and protect strategic installations and infrastruc-
tures. The presence of foreign fighters in this conflict 
and in the South Caucasus in general would be highly 
threatening to Russia, given the proximity of the area 
to the country. Third, according to several reports, 
Turkey kept a number of F-16 warplanes in the Azeri 
city of Ganja as a deterrence following a joint exercise 
in July and August of 2020.54 On the military side, 
Turkey has maintained deniability without necessari-
 
52 For a take on how Turkey transferred its drone warfare 
capacity to Azerbaijan, see Can Kasapoglu, Turkey Transfers 
Drone Warfare Capacity to Its Ally Azerbaijan (Washington, DC: 
The Jamestown Foundation, 15 October 2020), https://james 
town.org/program/turkey-transfers-drone-warfare-capacity-to-
its-ally-azerbaijan/ (accessed 18 November 2020). Also, many 
believe that Turkey played the central role in Azerbaijan’s 
victory; for such a perspective see, Mark Galeotti, “Russian 
Ceasefire Deal in Nagorno-Karabakh Marks Slow, Painful 
End of Empire in the South Caucasus”, The Moscow Times, 
10 November 2020, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/ 
11/10/russian-ceasefire-deal-marks-slow-painful-end-of-
empire-in-the-south-caucasus-a72001 (accessed 18 November 
2020). 
53 Ragip Soylu, “Exclusive: Azerbaijan, Armenia ‘Near 
Ceasefire Deal’ on Nagorno-Karabakh”, Middle East Eye, 
8 November 2020, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/ 
nagorno-karabakh-ceasefire-deal-azerbaijan-armenia 
(accessed 18 November 2020). 
54 Patrick Keddie, “What’s Turkey’s Role in the Nagorno-
Karabakh Conflict?” Al Jazeera, 30 October 2020, https://www. 
aljazeera.com/features/2020/10/30/whats-turkeys-role-in-the-
nagorno-karabakh-conflict (accessed 18 November 2020). 
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ly denying the above-mentioned activities.55 Moreo-
ver, if necessary, Turkey could justify its military 
assistance to Azerbaijan by citing the Strategic Part-
nership and Mutual Assistance Agreement, which it 
signed with Baku in 2010 and covers broad areas for 
security cooperation between the two sides.56 Finally, 
the Turkish-supported Azerbaijani military campaign 
in this recent conflict was geared towards undermin-
ing the previous status quo in the frozen conflict – 
despite the fact that the international community, 
including the UN, has recognised the Nagorno-
Karabakh and its seven surrounding areas as belong-
ing to Azerbaijan, these areas had been under 
Armenian control until this latest fight. 
At the diplomatic level, Turkey was isolated. It 
reached out to Russia to launch a bilateral track, 
similar to the Astana process, on this conflict. Turkey 
would have preferred this to gain primacy over the 
Minsk Group of the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe,57 which was set up to find a 
peaceful resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
and is co-chaired by the US, Russia, and France – the 
Minsk Group was completely sidelined during this 
latest fight and the diplomatic process that followed. 
However, given that the conflict was taking place in 
the post-Soviet space, Russia, at least initially, did 
not have much motivation for a bilateral track with 
Turkey in the form of a new Astana process on the 
conflict – particularly not a process in which Mos-
cow and Ankara would have been seen as being on 
equal-footing in leading it. Unlike Turkey’s desire to 
launch a process in which it would be seen as the 
backer of Azerbaijan and Russia of Armenia, Moscow 
preferred to play the role of big brother to both 
countries – it did not want to forsake its influence 
over Azerbaijan. In any case, an Astana-style process 
would have further increased and legitimised Tur-
key’s role in the conflict and in what is regarded to be 
Russia’s backyard, which is something that Russia 
wanted to avoid. 
In spite of this, given the fact that this conflict is 
between two countries that are close to Moscow, 
 
55 As Ozgur Unluhisarcikli of the German Marshall Fund 
Ankara office would put it, communication with the author, 
November 2020. 
56 Daria Isachenko, Turkey–Russia Partnership in the War over 
Nagorno-Karabakh, SWP Comment 53/2020 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2020). 
57 For an overview on the mandate of the OSCE’s Minsk 
Group, see “OSCE Minsk Group”, https://www.osce.org/mg 
(accessed 18 November 2020). 
Turkey’s military escalation strategy in Nagorno-
Karabakh worked in favour of Turkish interests but 
against Russian interests. The logic for this escalation 
strategy was clear: If Russia took a back seat while 
Azerbaijan continued to recover more lands, then 
Turkey’s gambit would pay off. Azerbaijan would be 
grateful for Turkey, and its influence in the country 
would grow58 – this is largely what happened. If 
Russia had stepped in more forcefully on the side of 
Armenia, then it would have risked alienating Azer-
baijan, which again would have pushed Baku closer 
to Ankara.59 For Moscow, the best-case scenario was 
the limited accommodation of Azerbaijan, and then 
to once again freeze the conflict. Meanwhile, for 
Turkey, de-freezing and upsetting the status quo were 
the preferred options, as Ankara saw the previous 
status quo inimical to its interests.60 Therefore, in 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia was in a more difficult 
position when it came to engaging in a balancing act 
between different sets of interests and concerns. 
Thus, this conflict put Turkish-Russian relations to 
the test while also placing Moscow in an uncomforta-
ble position. 
Mechanism of (non)cooperation 
For Turkey, the victory would not have solely meant 
military gains, it would have also meant political 
parity with Moscow in the conflict. To that effect, 
from early on in the conflict, Turkey strived to work 
with Moscow to deal with it. However, Turkey’s 
outreach to Russia to create a bilateral track on 
 
58 For a similar take, see Maxim Suchkov, “In Nagorno-
Karabakh, Russia Faces an Unenviable Task”, The Moscow 
Times, 16 October 2020, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/ 
2020/10/16/in-nagorno-karabakh-russia-faces-an-unenviable-
task-a71778 (accessed 18 November 2020). 
59 Ibid. 
60 See Galip Dalay’s comments in Reuters: “Turkey’s logic 
in almost all corners of the map is disruption. Anything that 
undermines the status quo is good for it, because the previ-
ous status quo was seen to counter its interests. In Nagorno-
Karabakh there was a frozen conflict in which it remained 
in Armenia’s hands. Turkey wants to undermine this game 
even if it cannot fully determine it” given Russia’s tradi-
tional influence in the region”, see “In Nagorno-Karabakh 
Conflict, Erdogan Eyes Turkey’s ‘Place in World Order’”, 
Reuters, 7 October 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/ 
armenia-azerbaijan-erdogan-analysis-int-idUSKBN26S0HZ 
(accessed 20 November 2020). 
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Nagorno-Karabakh has borne no fruit. Russia’s initial 
attempts to broker a ceasefire between the warring 
sides did not include Turkey. At the request of 
Turkey, the first Putin-Erdoğan conversation on the 
conflict occurred on 14 October 2020.61 Only hours 
before this phone call, Russia had struck pro-Turkish 
Syrian rebels in Idlib.62 Russia continued to pursue a 
policy of putting pressure on Turkey through Syria 
throughout the Karabakh conflict. For instance, on 26 
October 2020, Russian fighter jets attacked a training 
camp that belongs to the Faylaq al-Sham group of the 
Turkish-created Syrian National Army in the Jabal 
Duwayli area of Idlib, which is only 10 kilometres 
from the Turkish border.63 This attack killed around 
80 rebels.64 Just as Nagorno-Karabakh was Russia’s 
soft spot, Syria was Turkey’s. By putting pressure on 
Ankara through Syria, Moscow was trying to balance 
its vulnerabilities with Ankara. Moreover, by pointing 
to the reported transfer of Syrian mercenaries to the 
scene of conflict, Russian officials were indirectly 
accusing Turkey of bringing the menace of terrorism 
to the region.65 
Moscow was therefore clear with its red lines and 
displeasure with Turkish policy. Again, for the diplo-
matic track, it consistently referred to the Minsk 
Group framework for the resolution of the conflict 
and called upon Turkey to make its contribution to 
the political solution through this framework, as 
 
61 “President Erdoğan, Russian President Putin Talk over 
Phone”, Directorate of Communications: Presidency of the Republic 
of Turkey, 14 October 2020, https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/ 
english/haberler/detay/president-erdogan-russian-president-
putin-talkover-phone (accessed 20 November 2020). 
62 See the released images of this strike: https://twitter.com/ 
VeraVanHorne/status/1316368603252510722, also see in 
Suchkov, “In Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia Faces an Unenviable 
Task” (see note 58). 
63 “Russian Strikes Kill at Least 78 in Opposition’s Training 
Camp in Syria’s Idlib”, Daily Sabah, 26 October 2020, 
https://www.dailysabah.com/world/syrian-crisis/russian-
strikes-kill-at-least-78-in-oppositions-training-camp-in-syrias-
idlib (accessed 20 November 2020). 
64 Ibid. 
65 “Russia Warns That Nagorno-Karabakh Could Become 




1217181 (accessed 20 November 2020); also see “Telephone 
Conversation with President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Er-
dogan”, President of Russia, 14 October 2020, http://en.kremlin. 
ru/events/president/news/64204 (accessed 20 November 2020). 
Turkey is also a member of the group, but not one of 
its co-chairs.66 Corollary to this, later on, when Russia 
started to engage Turkey more seriously on the sub-
ject, it did so in a non-structured and non-publicised 
manner – without undermining the primacy of 
the Minsk Group framework, at least in its discourse. 
As manifested in the ceasefire deal67 that Russia 
brokered between Armenia and Azerbaijan on 
9 November 2020, Russia met Turkey only halfway 
in terms of Ankara’s aspirations. It had to recognise 
Turkey’s role, but it did not accord it parity in the 
conflict. 
The missing part in the ceasefire deal 
Prior to the ceasefire deal,68 Moscow and Ankara had 
established a parallel bilateral track on the conflict. 
By pointing to the existence of a parallel Turkish-
Russian track and the ensuing ceasefire, many drew 
correlations between this ceasefire and the multiple 
ceasefire deals that Turkey and Russia had signed 
over Idlib. However, the Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire 
deal and the multiple Idlib deals are instead marked 
by their differences. First, apart from representing 
a major setback for Armenia, this deal partially satis-
fies the Azerbaijani side, puts Russian boots on the 
ground, and creates a new temporary status quo, 
hence re-freezing the conflict. This is in line with 
Russian interests. However, the more the conflict 
thawed and the more the old status quo was 
 
66 “Telephone Conversation with President of Turkey 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan”, President of Russia, 14 October 2020, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64204 (accessed 
20 November 2020). 
67 “Main Points of Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Deal”, 
The Moscow Times, 10 November 2020, https://www.the 
moscowtimes.com/2020/11/10/main-points-of-nagorno-
karabakh-peace-deal-a72003 (accessed 20 November 2020). 
68 Majority sees this deal as the best possible outcome 
that Russia could have achieved given the circumstances, for 
instance see, Alexander Gabuev, “Viewpoint: Russia and 
Turkey – Unlikely Victors of Karabakh Conflict”, BBC News, 
12 November 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
europe-54903869 (accessed 21 November 2020); but a 
minority disagree with this judgement, see, Mark Galeotti, 
“Russian Ceasefire Deal in Nagorno-Karabakh Marks Slow, 
Painful End of Empire in the South Caucasus”, The Moscow 
Times, 10 November 2020, https://www.themoscowtimes. 
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undermined, the better the situation became for 
Turkey. In contrast, Russian interests lay with the 
partial accommodation of Azerbaijani’s aspirations 
and the re-freezing of the conflict based on a new 
status quo. In this respect, the ceasefire deal is 
broadly speaking in accordance with Russia’s initial 
projected outcome. Second, despite Turkey being the 
main external backer of Azerbaijan during this con-
flict, the deal that concluded this latest fight was 
signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia. Turkey is 
not a signatory to this agreement. Russia hence main-
tained primacy during the diplomatic phase. Third, 
unlike in Idlib, peacekeeping missions (military 
patrols) will be solely conducted by Russia – there 
will be no joint patrols, hence no Turkish boots on 
the ground. Turkey will only send observers. The 
details and mechanism of this observation mission 
are not clear yet and will be sorted out bilaterally 
between Turkey and Russia. But in any case, peace-
keeping is essentially Russia’s show, with a ceremo-
nial role being assigned to Turkey. Thus, asymmetry 
and hierarchy mark this deal – in favour of Russia – 
in terms of the roles of Turkey and Russia in the 
diplomatic resolution of this conflict, as manifested 
through the Moscow ceasefire agreement.69 
Despite this, Russia could not disregard Turkey’s 
role entirely. The parallel track that Moscow and 
Ankara established for the conflict reflects this. How-
ever, to Ankara’s chagrin, Moscow was careful not to 
let this parallel track morph into a structured process 
on the conflict and hollow out the Minsk Group 
mission – in the same way that the Astana process 
restructured the Syrian conflict and hollowed out the 
Geneva process. This conflict and the ensuing cease-
fire deal revealed four dynamics. First, Turkey force-
fully inserted itself into the Armenian-Azerbaijani 
dispute on behalf of Baku, and it increased its role 
and profile in the changing regional order of the 
South Caucasus. Second, Russia maintained its prima-
cy in the region. Third, the West’s role and influence 
suffered a blow as a result of this conflict and the 
ceasefire arrangement that followed. Finally, whereas 
in Syria, Turkish-Russian cooperation and engage-
ment served both countries’ national interests and 
increased their influence – at the expense of that of 
Western powers – in Nagorno-Karabakh (in the post-
Soviet space or Russia’s “near abroad”), the increase 
in Turkish influence would come not only at the 
 
69 See Galip Dalay: https://twitter.com/GalipDalay/status/ 
1326123814909059073. 
expense of the West, but also at the expense of 
Russia’s influence as well. This is why Russia resisted 
launching a structured bilateral process on the con-
flict with Turkey, even though it could not disregard 
Turkey’s role completely. 
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The process that started in Syria has resulted in Tur-
key and Russia developing closer relations on many 
issues, including Ankara buying Russian-made S-400 
missile systems,70 exploring ways to launch a process 
on Libya,71 and signing a deal for a natural gas pipe-
line project (TurkStream) to carry Russian gas through 
Turkey to Europe.72 Despite these growing areas 
and instances of cooperation between the two sides, 
whenever there have been disagreements between 
Moscow and Ankara, Moscow has certainly not shied 
away from drawing its red lines. Likewise, despite the 
structured engagements on Syria, talks on Libya, and 
non-structured modus vivendi on Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Turkish-Russian relations are built on mistrust and 
geopolitical rivalries. From the Black Sea to the 
Caucasus, and the Middle East to the Balkans, there 
is not a single issue or crisis for which Turkey and 
Russia are on the same side of the table.73 
In other words, although the levels of engagement 
and interdependencies in Turkish-Russian relations 
are fast increasing, there is no sign of a decrease in 
 
70 “Turkey Signs Deal to Get Russian S-400 Air Defence 
Missiles”, BBC News, 12 September 2017, https://www.bbc.co. 
uk/news/world-europe-41237812 (accessed 27 November 
2020). 
71 “No: 156, 22 July 2020, Joint Statement on the Turkish-
Russian High-Level Consultations on Libya (Ankara, 22 July 
2020)”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey. 
72 “Russia and Turkey Sign Deal to Build TurkStream Gas 
Pipeline”, Reuters, 10 October 2016, https://de.reuters.com/ 
article/russia-turkey-gas-pipeline/update-1-russia-and-turkey-
sign-deal-to-build-turkstream-gas-pipeline-idUKL8N1CG4Z9 
(accessed 27 November 2020). 
73 Galip Dalay, “Turkey and Russia Are Bitter Frenemies”, 
Foreign Policy, 28 May 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/ 
28/turkey-and-russia-are-bitter-frenemies/ (accessed 
27 November 2020). 
the incompatibilities of their geopolitical aspirations, 
nor in the inbuilt deficit of trust in this relationship. 
The features of these relations, in return, elicit 
questions about the nature of this interdependency 
and the (a)symmetry in these relations. To be more 
precise, many regard this interdependency as being 
imbalanced and asymmetric, meaning that one side 
is more dependent or has more to lose than the other 
in the event of a breakdown of relations, hence the 
“exit cost”74 of this relationship is greater for one 
side than the other. It is implied that Turkey is more 
dependent on Russia in this relationship. By exten-
sion, in the event of a rupture, Turkey is more likely 
to incur a greater cost than Russia. For instance, in 
the event of a breakdown in Syria, Turkey can signi-
ficantly drive up the cost of a confrontation for Russia 
and the regime, but Russia on its end can push mil-
lions of people from Idlib into Turkey, debilitate the 
Syrian opposition, and facilitate a greater role for 
the Syrian Kurds in the political process on Syria. 
This exit cost analysis is not solely informed by the 
geopolitical repercussions of a rupture, but by the 
economic ones as well. To clarify, in Turkish-Russian 
economic exchanges, Turkey provides Russia with 
vegetables, textiles, construction business, and other 
finished goods. In return, it gets natural gas and oil, 
nuclear reactors, millions of tourists, and recently the 
 
74 For a detailed analysis on the subject, see Tolga 
Demiryol, “Türkiye – Rusya Arasında Asimetrik İlişki ve 
Bağımlılık” [Turkey and Russia’s Asymmetric Relations and 
Dependency], Perspektif (A quality opinion page), 5 May 2020, 
https://www.perspektif.online/turkiye-rusya-arasinda-
asimetrik-iliski-ve-bagimlilik/ (accessed 27 November 2020). 
On the question of interdependency, see Seckin Kostem, 
“The Political Economy of Turkish-Russian Relations: 
Dynamics of Asymmetric Interdependence”, Perceptions 13, 
no. 2 (2018): 10–32. 
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S-400 missile systems from Russia. In the event of a 
breakdown of relations, Russia would have a rela-
tively easier time replacing Turkish products than 
vice versa.75 Thus, the exit cost for Russia is compara-
tively lower. Therefore, the structure of their eco-
nomic relations, coupled with the nature of their 
geopolitical engagements, indicates the unequal and 
asymmetric character of Moscow-Ankara interde-
pendencies and relations. 
However, the nature of Turkish-Russian inter-
dependencies, including its asymmetric character, 
should not be seen as a static element – asymmetry 
is dynamic and subject to change. Indeed, this is what 
is happening. Turkey has engaged in what can be 
termed “dependency reduction” on Russia, both geo-
politically and economically (or structurally), which 
in return bears policy implications for the future. 
 
75 Demiryol, “Türkiye – Rusya Arasında Asimetrik İlişki 
ve Bağımlılık” (see note 74). 
Reducing Turkey’s structural dependency 
on Russia in the energy field 
Through energy explorations, energy purchases from 
friendlier countries, and the diversification of shares 
of different energy forms in its overall energy (gas) 
imports, Turkey is aiming to reduce its strategic vul-
nerabilities and energy dependency. For a long time, 
Russia and Iran occupied the top two positions, 
respectively, regarding Turkey’s natural gas imports. 
These are the two countries with which Turkey has 
competitive regional aspirations. For this reason, Tur-
key has pursued a policy of reducing its dependency 
on these countries in the energy field.76 Figure 1 
clearly shows the changes in the country breakdown 
of Turkey’s natural gas imports. In line with this 
trend, during the first half of 2020, Turkey’s natural 
gas imports from Iran and Russia declined by 44.8% 
and 41.5%, respectively, compared to the same period 
 
76 Galip Dalay, Turkey, Europe, and the Eastern Mediterranean: 
Charting a Way out of the Current Deadlock, Policy Briefing 
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Geopolitical dependency reduction on Russ a
in 2019.77 In contrast, Turkey’s imports from Azer-
baijan increased by 23.4% during the same period 
compared to the first half of 2019.78 Azerbaijan now 
occupies the largest share of Turkey’s natural gas 
market. Through its energy exploration activities in 
the East Mediterranean and Black Sea regions, Turkey 
wants to further reduce its natural gas dependency on 
its rivals. Similarly, the share of liquefied natural gas 
(LNG), which Turkey imports from sources as diverse 
as Qatar, the US, Algeria, and Nigeria, in its overall 
level of gas imports is rapidly increasing. At a time 
when the share of Russian gas in Turkish gas imports 
plunged from 52% in 2017 to 33% in 2019,79 the 
 
77 Nuran Erkul Kaya, “Turkey’s Gas Imports from Russia 
and Iran Fall Sharply”, Anadolu Agency, 24 August 2020, 
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/turkey-s-gas-imports-from-
russia-and-iran-fall-sharply/1951397 (accessed 27 November 
2020). 
78 Ibid. 
79 “Russian Share of Gas Imports Falls As Turkey Turns 
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share of LNG rose from 19.5% to 29% during the same 
period.80 Figure 2 clearly illustrates how the share of 
LNG is fast increasing in Turkey’s overall gas imports 
in recent years. These trends in the Turkish energy 
market are set to continue. Long-term gas contracts 
between Turkey and Russia are due for renewal to-
wards the end of 2021.81 With Turkey’s decreasing 
dependency on Russian gas, coupled with the diver-
sification of its gas import sources and the availability 
of competitive prices, Turkey will have a better nego-
tiating position compared to before. 
Geopolitical dependency reduction 
on Russia 
Similar to its efforts to downsize its energy dependen-
cy on Russia, Ankara has also engaged in what can be 
termed a geopolitical balancing act vis-à-vis Moscow. 
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In recent years, the fast improvement in Turkish-
Russian relations has been accompanied by a corre-
sponding deterioration in Turkish-Western relations. 
This has resulted in a lopsided Turkish foreign policy 
when it comes to its relations with major powers. In 
fact, instead of making Turkey strategically more 
autonomous – as pro-government pundits claim in 
Turkey – the way that Turkish-Russian relations are 
being conducted is making Turkey strategically more 
vulnerable. In other words, the decline in Turkish-
Western relations has increased Turkey’s dependency 
and strategic vulnerabilities vis-à-vis powers such as 
Russia, but also China. Turkey has searched for ways 
to address its strategic dependency and vulnerabilities 
vis-à-vis Russia. 
First, Turkish-Ukrainian relations are fast expand-
ing. Both countries signed a military cooperation 
agreement on 16 October 2020.82 Geopolitically, this 
deal and the overall close cooperation between Tur-
key and Ukraine aim to counterbalance Russia’s 
influence in the Black Sea region. Given the trajectory 
of recent years, it is plausible to anticipate that 
Ankara-Kiev relations will continue to improve. 
Second, in Libya, Turkey appears to be continuing 
with its double-track policy with the US and Russia. 
Turkey is likely to avoid pursuing a policy that would 
antagonise the US at this stage. In this conflict, Tur-
key is happy with the US’ anti-Russia policy, which 
Ankara believes serves its interests. Unless the Joe 
Biden administration adopts a radically different posi-
tion on this conflict, Turkey will be mindful of the 
US position in Libya. Therefore, unlike in Syria – 
where Turkey’s strained relations with almost all the 
Western powers (especially with US CENTCOM) have 
increased Turkey’s strategic vulnerabilities vis-à-vis 
Russia – in Libya, the degree of Turkey’s dependency 
and vulnerabilities vis-à-vis Russia is limited for two 
primary reasons: First, Russia does not have the same 
level of primacy in Libya as it does in Syria. Second, 
unlike in Syria, Turkey has better working relations 
with the US (particularly the Africa Command) as well 
as several European countries such as Italy. 
Third, through its policy on the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict, Turkey wants to balance the strategic vul-
nerabilities in its relations with Moscow, among 
other goals. As Syria is Turkey’s soft spot, Nagorno-
 
82 “Turkey, Ukraine Sign Military Cooperation Agree-
ments”, Voice of America, 16 October 2020, https://www. 
voanews.com/europe/turkey-ukraine-sign-military-
cooperation-agreements (accessed 29 November 2020). 
Karabakh was and partially still is Russia’s. Russia 
can threaten Turkey using Syria and drive up the 
costs for Turkey there, the same way Turkey tried 
using Nagorno-Karabakh against Russia. Corollary to 
this, Turkey will continue with its policy of coaxing 
Azerbaijan more into its orbit, which will further 
strengthen Turkey’s standing in the Black Sea and 
South Caucasus vis-à-vis Russia. If the Central Asian 
vector of Turkish foreign policy gains more promi-
nence in the new period, this will have a similar 
effect on Turkish-Russian relations. 
In sum, Turkish-Russian relations, both economi-
cally as well geopolitically, are asymmetric in favour 
of Moscow. Conscious of this asymmetry – and the 
strategic vulnerabilities that result from it – Ankara 
has pursued policies to address this challenge, hence 
reducing its dependency and vulnerabilities vis-à-vis 
Russia. However, the dismal state of Turkish-Western 
relations makes this task harder to achieve. 
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In spite of the dynamism and developments in Tur-
kish-Russian relations since 2015, we cannot extra-
polate that the same level of cooperation will con-
tinue, provided that Turkish-Western relations do not 
experience a rupture. First, as discussed in the specific 
cases above, Turkish-Russian relations are already 
facing limitations. Second, Turkey is already engaged 
in downsizing its dependency on and geopolitical 
vulnerabilities vis-à-vis Russia. Third, the structural 
limitations of these relations are highly likely to be 
more visible and pronounced going forward. 
To explain these increasingly close relations in 
recent years, the analysis mainly features Turkey’s 
motives. What is perplexing is not that Russia would 
want to form closer relations with Turkey regionally 
or bilaterally; the benefits of such engagements for 
Russia is clear. On top of economic and energy inter-
ests (including Russia building Turkey’s first nuclear 
power plant) and given Turkey’s membership in 
NATO, undermining NATO’s cohesion and creating 
more friction between Ankara and its NATO partners 
serve Russia’s interests. For instance, as a NATO mem-
ber, Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 systems confers 
more prestige on these systems and generates more 
tension between Turkey and the US – both of these 
developments serve Russia well. Similarly, coopera-
tion with Turkey gave more legitimacy to Russian-
designed processes in the conflict zones, most impor-
tantly in Syria. The list of benefits that Russia has 
accrued from its engagements or cooperation with 
Turkey goes on. Plus, unlike Turkey, Russia does not 
have to pay a cost for forming increasingly close rela-
tions with Turkey. In contrast, from being removed 
from the F-35 fighter jet programme to the CAATSA 
sanctions to the deepening crisis in its relations with 
the West, Turkey has to pay a heavy price for its close 
relations with Russia and purchasing the Russian-
made S-400 missile systems. 
Given the price involved, how to account for Tur-
key’s motivations in establishing increasingly close 
relations with Russia? Broadly speaking, there are 
three dominant explanatory accounts for these 
relations from Turkey’s perspective: political (dis-
content with the West), systemic, and personal 
agency. These explanatory paradigms shed light on 
the different dynamics of these relations, but none 
is suited to provide a comprehensive picture. 
Discontent with the West as the glue 
of their relations 
The concept of an “axis of excluded”83 has been 
utilised as one of the explanatory paradigms that has 
been adopted by certain analysts to account for the 
deepening of Turkish-Russian relations. The basic 
argument behind this approach is that, despite struc-
tural differences and contrasting worldviews84 be-
tween Turkey and Russia, both actors are opting for 
closer relations as a result of their shared frustrations 
with Western and US policies being directed towards 
them.85 Applying this approach to the Middle Eastern 
context, this reading would see Turkey’s displeasure 
with US policy in the region as being the major driver 
for Ankara to seek better relations with Russia. In-
deed, the US – or the West in general – is the “invis-
ible” third party in most Turkish-Russian engage-
ments, particularly when it comes to Middle East 
policy.86 The state and health of Turkish-US relations 
has a direct impact on the nature of Turkish-Russian 
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relations. At least, this is the case from Turkey’s per-
spective. Relatedly, the opacity of US policy – or the 
perceived loss of its strategic clarity – the nature of 
its local partnerships in Syria (particularly its evolving 
relationships with the Syrian Democratic Forces, the 
backbone of which is formed by the YPG, which is 
affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK), 
and regional alliances (the US being highly supportive 
of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and 
Israel’s regional designs and visions in recent years) 
have further driven wedges between Turkey and the 
US. When it came to Donald Trump, there were two 
effects of his regional policy on Turkey. On the one 
hand, Trump was highly lenient vis-à-vis Turkey and 
President Erdoğan – including green-lighting Tur-
key’s military operation into north-eastern Syria and 
shielding Turkey for a long time from the CAATSA 
sanctions for purchasing Russian-made S-400 missile 
systems (he imposed these sanctions in the last days 
of his presidency after being forced to by Congress). 
On the other hand, Trump’s broader regional policy, 
which was premised on supporting the fledgling 
partnership between Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, 
and Israel, was running counter to Turkish interests. 
These factors have also created extra incentives 
for Turkey to seek better relations with Russia and 
alternative realignments. But a level of caution is 
warranted here. The debate on Turkey’s supposed 
Eurasianist turn usually comes to the fore as a reac-
tion to Turkey’s deteriorating relations with the West. 
It is clear that the institutional and elite ownership 
of Turkey’s Western relations has significantly weak-
ened. Traditionally, the foreign ministry and the 
military have provided strong institutional ownership 
for Turkey’s Western orientation. Likewise, foreign 
and security policy elites, but not solely them, have 
played decisive roles in sustaining these relationships. 
The roles and outlooks of these actors and institutions 
have undergone major changes in Turkey. As a result, 
there have been institutional and elite deficits when 
it comes to keeping Turkey’s previous Western orien-
tation. Yet, this deficit in Turkish-Western relations 
has not translated into institutional and elite owner-
ship of Turkish-Russian relations. As it stands, Tur-
kish-Russian relations are neither strongly pushed by 
society, the elite, or institutions within Turkey. Struc-
turally, these relationships are still premised on 
relatively weak foundations. 
In this regard, Turkey’s governing elites often 
justify Turkey’s closer relations with Russia and China 
by referring to the fashionable, but largely nebulous, 
concept of searching for strategic autonomy in 
Turkish foreign policy. This means that Turkey will 
attain its goals much more effectively through a 
balancing act between different centres of power. 
Despite such framing, the way it is operationalised, 
strategic autonomy effectively means making Turkey 
less dependent on the West rather than making it an 
autonomous actor in international affairs altogeth-
er.87 Moreover, given the growing lopsidedness in 
Turkey’s relations with Russia and China (in favour 
of them) versus the US and Europe, the way that this 
search is being conducted is increasing Turkey’s 
strategic vulnerabilities rather than its resilience and 
autonomy. Turkey’s silence on China’s persecution 
of the Turkic Uighur Muslims and its downplaying of 
Russia’s role in the Russia-Syria regime killing88 of 
36 Turkish soldiers in Idlib on 27 February 2020 
illustrate Turkey’s growing vulnerabilities vis-à-vis 
these two powers. Turkey is partially trading its 
dependency on the West with dependency on Russia 
and China, over which it has even less leverage.89 
Adaptation to systemic changes 
in international affairs 
Turkish leaders’ reading of international affairs 
coupled with systemic changes in international poli-
tics, particularly in the Middle East, are additional 
drivers of the close relations between Moscow and 
Ankara. One of the central assumptions of Turkey’s 
ruling elites about the international system is that it 
is no longer Western-centric, if not post-Western. This 
reading sees the global order as being destined to be 
multipolar, which in return provides regional powers 
such as Turkey with more room for manoeuvre. From 
this perspective, Turkish interests will be better 
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served through a geopolitical balancing act between 
different centres of powers.90 
Several systemic changes in global politics, but 
more importantly in the Middle East, have further 
strengthened these readings and assumptions. First, 
Turkish-Chinese relations are not yet at the same 
level as Turkish-Russian relations. However, Ankara 
is trying to cultivate closer economic ties with China 
while maintaining complete silence on China’s per-
secution of Uighur Muslims as the price for these ties. 
In any case, the government appears to see more 
opportunities than threats in the rise of China. Sec-
ond, at the Middle Eastern level, the US is downsizing 
its commitments and footprint – not necessarily 
its capabilities – in regional politics. Even though 
Trump implemented this strategy in a more disorder-
ly fashion, this policy precedes him and had started 
during Obama’s presidency. This partial US with-
drawal has created a power vacuum in the MENA 
region and the Mediterranean, which has led to fierce 
power rivalries among regional and international 
actors. Corollary to this, the nature of the Middle 
East’s relations with international powers has under-
gone a major change and gained a multi-polar char-
acter.91 Russia’s role in regional security and China’s 
in the regional economy have relatively increased. 
Similarly, the role of regional powers in shaping 
regional affairs has also relatively increased. Not only 
powers such as Turkey, Iran, and Israel, but also 
countries such as the UAE and Qatar have scaled-up 
their presence and prominence in regional politics. 
All these systemic changes were fully on display 
in the three conflict zones (Syria, Libya, and the 
Nagorno-Karabakh) where Turkey and Russia were 
involved. To be more precise, the US was not willing 
to get involved deeply with these conflicts. Russia, in 
contrast, was willing to play a much more forceful 
role in the same conflicts. Likewise, Turkey, similar to 
other regional states, has intervened directly and mili-
tarily in these conflicts. In the end, close engagements 
between Turkey and Russia in the Syrian conflict 
occurred around mid-2016, almost a year after Rus-
sia’s direct military involvement in the conflict, by 
which time it became clear that the US was not 
 
90 Ibid. 
91 Galip Dalay, The Middle East After Trump: A Reshuffling of 
the Cards? (Berlin: Robert Bosch Academy, January 2021), 
https://www.robertboschacademy.de/en/perspectives/middle-
east-after-trump-reshuffling-cards (accessed 16 February 
2021). 
interested in any expansive or deeper entanglement 
in the Syrian imbroglio beyond the war on terror 
and its presence in north-eastern Syria. On top of the 
Turkish government’s reading of, or assumptions 
about, international politics, this perspective thus 
sees Turkish-Russian engagements on the conflict 
zones in the Middle East and beyond as an outcome 
of the systemic changes in regional politics, political 
realism, and geopolitical imperatives. 
Geopolitics and the personalities of 
leaders in Ankara and Moscow 
The role of the leading actors, namely Erdoğan and 
Putin, needs to be contextualised and situated within 
a historical trajectory while analysing these bilateral 
relations. In the end, it is not clear what will tran-
spire, as Turkish-Russian relations are essentially 
Putin-Erdoğan relations – institutional agency in this 
relationship is still weak. Policy-wise, this distinction 
does not mean much at present – in the end, these 
two actors are the ultimate decision-makers in their 
respective countries. However, this distinction, or lack 
thereof, is important in projecting the future course 
of Moscow-Ankara relations. Despite the differences 
in political upbringings, formative experiences, and 
styles, Erdoğan and Putin share certain qualities. As 
two strong men, both leaders hold the ultimate say 
in their respective countries’ foreign, defence, and 
domestic policies and are representatives of the socio-
logical transformations that their countries have 
undergone – at least this is the case in Turkey’s 
context. 
Despite their portrayals in the media, neither 
leader is an aberration in their country’s political 
history. But both leaders’ quest for status and recog-
nition in international politics and their displeasure 
with their “status” vis-à-vis the West is in line with 
the historical course of both countries. Post-Erdoğan, 
in geopolitical terms, is unlikely to be anti-Erdoğan in 
Turkey.92 Despite the potential differences in style 
and discourse, the likely alternatives to Erdoğan down 
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the road might put forward a starkly different domes-
tic political vision for Turkey, but it is unlikely that 
they will be completely different when it comes to 
Turkey’s geopolitical ambition, its “status anxiety” 
regarding the West, and its quest for international 
recognition – but they can obviously adopt different 
styles and strategies in pursuing similar policy goals, 
which can make major differences as regards the 
tension in Turkish-Western relations. In this respect, 
in geopolitical terms, Erdoğan’s geopolitical disposi-
tion is partially a reflection of Turkey’s quest for 
status and its accumulated grievances and discontent 
with the West – although, this disposition has cer-
tainly been coloured and flavoured by Erdoğan’s 
ideological convictions, political experience, domestic 
political goals, personal style, and authoritarian turn 
in Turkey. 
It is the credibility of the commit-
ment and predictability, not 
trust, that define relations between 
Putin and Erdoğan. 
Arguably, despite the differences, a similar case 
can be made about Putin and his meaning for Rus-
sia’s political history and geopolitical vision. In this 
respect, “post-Putin Russia” is unlikely to be “anti-
Putin”.93 Russia’s quest for status in international 
affairs and opposition to Western/NATO geopolitical 
projections will not change following Putin’s depar-
ture from power. Therefore, the flamboyance and 
eccentricity of these leaders should not render us 
oblivious to the historical and political currents be-
hind the formation of their geopolitical dispositions 
and visions. The difference is that, whereas Turkey 
mainly seeks parity with the major European powers 
(Germany, France, and Britain) and a redefinition of 
its relationship with the US, Russia seeks parity with 
the US. Moreover, regarding itself as part of the 
broader cultural West,94 Russia seeks a redressing of 
its relationships with the West. 
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the_arrival_of_post_putin_russia-02032018.pdf (accessed 
2 March 2021). 
94 During an online meeting of the World Economic 
Forum (2021), Klaus Schwab posed the following question to 
Russia President Vladimir Putin: “How do you see the future 
of European-Russian relations?” Vladimir Putin: “You know 
there are things of an absolutely fundamental nature such as 
Being part of the institutional West, Turkey is 
pursuing a redefinition of its place largely within the 
West, not solely in relation to the West. This last 
point is also crucial to understand what Turkey, at 
least under the current government, is giving up and 
what it is holding onto in its relations with the West. 
Turkey is giving up on what can be depicted as the 
“idea of the West”, which historically meant that the 
West served as a reference point for Turkey’s socio-
political transformation and economic modernisation 
and “the idea of the indispensability of the West”, 
which traditionally meant Turkey filtering all its 
other major geopolitical engagements and orienta-
tions through the Western lens.95 However, Ankara is 
not giving up on the institutions of the West, be it 
NATO or the Customs Union with the EU. Instead, it 
aspires to redefine its role and position within these 
institutions and the broader Western framework. 
Finally, in spite of the personal chemistry between 
Erdoğan and Putin, Turkish-Russian relations are not 
trust-based. Instead, they are premised on historical 
mistrust and consciousness. However, the predictabil-
ity, delivery, and credibility of the commitments that 
they make to each other provide the glue of these 
relations.96 Therefore, it is the credibility of the com-
mitment and predictability, not trust, that define rela-
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Many analyses on current Turkish-Russian relations 
are disproportionately informed by the engagement 
in Syria. Undeniably, Syria is central to the present 
shape of these relations. However, it is also a unique 
crisis, and the dynamics of these relations are un-
likely to be applicable in other contexts. Instead, the 
future prospects of Turkish-Russian relations, par-
ticularly within the context of the Middle East, will be 
shaped – or more accurately experience limitations 
– by a variety of conjectural as well as structural 
factors. On top of Middle Eastern-specific factors, 
Moscow-Ankara relations are also encumbered by a 
set of broader strategic constraints. 
Limits of the Turkish-Russian partnership 
in the Middle East 
First, Turkey and Russia have a different space for 
manoeuvring in the Middle East due to their histori-
cal relations and past track records in the region. 
Despite its policy on behalf of certain actors in the 
Middle East – with arguably the exception of the 
Assad regime – Russia in effect entertains no special 
relationship with any actors in the region. Russia 
keeps the doors open to all Middle Eastern leaders 
and countries – for instance, in Libya, even though it 
is the main backer of the LNA, it has also established 
relations with the GNA. Though it has largely been 
associated with the counter-revolutionary camp in 
the Arab world since the Arab Spring, it still makes 
efforts to avoid falling into the traps of the Middle 
East’s infamous fault lines: Shia–Sunni; Iran–the 
Arab world; Israel–Iran; Palestinians–Israelis. Russia 
therefore escapes becoming part of the camp politics 
in the region. Turkey, on the other hand, has decid-
edly become part of certain camps in regional divides 
since the onset of the Arab uprisings. It was the lead-
ing regional power supporting the Arab uprisings. It 
established strong relations with the pro-Arab Spring 
actors and political Islamic groups in the region. 
During the early stages of the Arab Spring, the major 
defining character of the regional divide concerned 
where regional actors stood in relation to these 
uprisings. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, 
and Bahrain were strongly opposed to these uprisings 
– with the exception of the Syrian uprisings, which 
they supported in its early phases – and strived to 
turn the clock back to the pre–Arab Spring period in 
the region. In contrast, Turkey, Qatar, and certain 
non-state actors such as the Muslim Brotherhood-
affiliated groups in the region were the main cham-
pions of regional change, except in Bahrain, where 
the Saudi-led Arab Gulf coalition suppressed the 
Shia-majority Bahraini protestors. This divide drove 
wedges between Turkey and the anti–Arab Spring 
camp in the region. 
Second, there is a fundamental incompatibility 
between Russia’s and Turkey’s preferred regional 
partners – theoretically, this can be a strength and 
mean complementarity, but in practice it has not 
proved to be the case. Unlike the Soviet Union’s 
foreign policy, the present-day Middle East policy 
of Russia is not premised on a certain ideology – 
putting aside its aversion to popular protests and 
regime changes. Yet, stating that Russian regional 
policy is non-ideological is not the same as saying 
that Russia’s policy is colourless. One of the main 
features of Russia’s regional policy is its secular 
orientation. In contrast, Turkey has developed and 
maintained strong relations with the region’s political 
Islamic forces since the onset of the Arab uprisings. 
Third, the natures of the political economies of 
Turkey and Russia are also constraining factors in 
bilateral relations. Russia pursues policies that will 
reflect the interests of a major energy-exporting 
country, whereas Turkey represents a major energy-
importing country in its regional policy. Whereas 
Russia favours high energy prices, Turkey’s interests 
lie in low energy prices, particularly given Turkey’s 
huge current account deficit, which is partially 
caused by Turkey’s increasing energy needs. This 
incompatibility in the two countries’ political eco-
nomies will have some implications on their regional 
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Fourth, the Middle East has a different significance 
for Turkey and Russia in terms of their national inter-
ests and priorities. As reflected in the Russian Foreign 
Ministry’s Foreign Policy Concept Papers in 201397 
and 2016,98 the Middle East does not seem to be a 
priority region – unlike Europe and Asia, or at least 
not on par with Europe and Asia – for Russia’s for-
eign policy. In these papers, the Middle East is placed 
towards the end of the section on “Regional Priori-
ties”.99 This demonstrates how much importance Rus-
sia attaches to the Middle East as a region. It appears 
that Russia usually sees the Middle East through a 
global lens,100 and this region gains or loses impor-
tance in Russia’s foreign policy as a result of its other 
foreign policy priorities and visions: be it as an arena 
to assert Russia’s global power status, or as a context 
through which to deal with Russia’s problem of 
radicalism at home or in its near abroad much more 
effectively, or as a weapons market. Arguably, besides 
the imperatives of fast-changing developments on the 
ground in the Middle East, according such a relatively 
low level of importance to the region in comparison 
with Asia and Europe can partially account for why 
Russia seems to pursue such short-term, opportunis-
tic, issue, or agenda-focused and transactional policies 
towards the region. Furthermore, Russia appears to 
have carefully calculated the scale and depth of its 
regional involvement. Its targeted, low-cost, and 
limited-level engagements have proved to be effective 
thus far. For instance, Russia’s regional activism has 
a clear geographic focus. It appears that Russia is par-
ticularly interested in strengthening its position in 
the Eastern Mediterranean, as reflected in its policies 
towards Syria, Egypt, Libya, and Cyprus. Likewise, 
Russia covets the arms market of the Gulf states as 
well as the Gulf’s potential investment in the Russian 
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economy,101 along with desires for coordinating ener-
gy prices with Middle Eastern oil and gas producers 
in order to keep them high. Politically, Russia wants 
to maintain the political “status quo” in the region – 
Moscow looked at the Arab uprisings through the 
same lens that it had approached the Colour Revolu-
tions in its immediate neighbourhood and saw both 
processes as threatening and needing to be sup-
pressed. In spite of such features of its policy, Russia’s 
Middle East policy does not seem to have a long-term 
perspective or overall framework. Russia is therefore 
short-termist, transactional, and uncommitted – 
with no special relationships with any party (albeit 
with the possible exception of the Syrian regime) – 
and this puts a certain cap on what Russia can do and 
achieve in the region. 
Turkey, in contrast, sees the Middle East primarily 
through national and regional lenses. In the last 
decade, this region has sapped most of the energy, 
time, and resources from Turkish foreign policy. The 
meaning and significance of the Middle East has 
undergone several changes for its foreign policy. Prior 
to the Arab uprisings, Turkey had a largely economy-
focused foreign policy – premised on soft-power 
tools – for the region. Given its ability to speak with 
almost all the actors in the region, Turkey tried to 
carve out a unique position for itself through media-
tion efforts established between the region’s quarrel-
ling parties: be they Israel and Syria; different Pales-
tinian factions; Lebanese groups; Pakistan and 
Afghanistan; or regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. 
Moreover, Turkey pursued a more active and higher 
profile policy within the multilateral institutions 
of the region, such as the Organisation of Islamic 
Cooperation, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the 
Arab League.102 Turkey believed that its strengthened 
regional role would increase its international profile 
and role as well. With the onset of the Arab uprisings, 
Turkey championed a new regional order and devel-
oped hegemonic aspirations towards the region – 
believing that this process would inevitably give birth 
to a new regional order in which Turkey envisioned 
itself playing a leading role. During this time, Turkey 
 
101 Alexey Khlebnikov, Russia Looks to the Middle East to Boost 
Arms Exports (Washington, DC: Middle East Institute, 8 April 
2019), https://www.mei.edu/publications/russia-looks-middle-
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102 Galip Dalay and Dov Friedman, “The AK Party and the 
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Turkey 15, no. 2 (2013): 124, 132. 
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expanded the scope of its regional policy dramatical-
ly. Its foreign policy discourse and activism acquired a 
region-wide scale. The capacity–discourse gap of 
Turkey’s regional policy widened significantly during 
the same period. Yet, with the unravelling of the Arab 
Spring, the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, the emer-
gence of a de facto Syrian Kurdish region along the 
Turkish-Syrian borders, and the crumbling in 2015 of 
Turkey’s Kurdish peace process, which started in 
2013, plus the ensuing bloody conflict between Tur-
key and the PKK, Turkey has once again recalibrated 
its regional policy. This recalibration has also taken 
shape in the form of the militarisation of Turkish 
foreign policy, which has adopted a coercive diplo-
macy103 to attain its foreign policy goals in places as 
far flung as Syria, Iraq, Libya, the Eastern Mediter-
ranean, and Nagorno-Karabakh. 
At this stage, apart from the power struggles with 
the anti–Arab Spring countries, Turkey’s regional 
policy has partially become an extension of its domes-
tic policy and reflects its growing national security 
prerogatives. The Kurdish issue, in particular, has 
significantly shaped the contours and content of its 
regional policy, especially towards its immediate 
Middle Eastern neighbourhood. In the broader region, 
the political and geopolitical divide between Turkey 
and a set of anti–Arab Spring countries such as the 
UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt has had a major impact 
on Turkish foreign policy. As a corollary, Turkey sees 
the Middle East predominantly with a security-centric 
perspective. Despite such changes with regards to the 
meaning and significance of the Middle East in over-
all Turkish foreign policy, the Middle East will remain 
a priority region for Turkey for various reasons. In a 
similar vein, despite fluctuations in Turkey’s regional 
profile, it will remain a major regional power. It will 
continue to play an influential role in its immediate 
neighbourhood in the Middle East and the Eastern 
Mediterranean in particular. 
Finally, Turkey and Russia have had different 
standings on the regional status quo. At the regional 
level, after the Arab uprisings, Turkey operated as a 
revisionist power. It supported the overthrow of 
authoritarian regimes and the establishment of a new 
regional order, developing closer relations with the 
pro-change forces in the region. Despite the fact that 
in recent years, Turkey has adopted a much more 
 
103 Saban Kardas, Understanding Turkey’s Coercive Diplomacy, 
On Turkey, Policy Brief (The German Marshall Fund of the 
United States, August 2020). 
cautious stance on the continuing waves of protests 
in the Middle East, this does not change the overall 
picture. In contrast, Russia has operated as a status 
quo power in the region, displaying clear preferences 
for regional authoritarian strong men such as Sisi and 
Assad. It was suspicious towards the Arab uprisings 
and supported the incumbent regimes. Such a diver-
gence of preferences as regards the regional status 
quo created a strategic incompatibility between the 
two powers’ regional visions. 
Broader strategic constrains of Turkish-
Russian relations 
On top of these Middle Eastern-specific constraints, 
Ankara-Moscow relations also suffer from a lack of 
institutional and elite ownership, broader geopolitical 
incompatibility and historical consciousness, and 
divergent approaches to the regional and interna-
tional order. 
First, these bilateral relations have historical roots, 
including amities, rivalries, and enmities, and they 
have never been confined to just one specific context, 
such as Syria or Libya. Turkey is Russia’s biggest eco-
nomic partner in the entire MENA region.104 Until 
recently, Russia was Turkey’s largest energy provid-
er.105 Therefore, despite the centrality of Syria, and in 
a limited way Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkish-
Russian relations have always gone beyond Syria. This 
is particularly the case today. Yet, these relations are 
not sufficiently institutionalised, lack elite ownership 
(particularly in bureaucratic and political terms), and 
are fraught with strategic incompatibilities from the 
perspectives of both powers. 
Second, if we were to talk of any “grand strategy” 
of the Ottoman Empire in its last few centuries, it 
would arguably be the following: pursue policies that 
prevent the collapse of the empire and engage in 
different arrangements with major European powers 
to balance and contain Russia, and prevent Russian 
designs vis-à-vis the empire.106 There has always been 
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a geopolitical consciousness among both the Ottoman 
and republican elites as regards Russia’s geopolitical 
ambitions and power projection. In the end, it was 
the Soviet demand for territory and special rights in 
the management of the Turkish Straits in 1945 that 
motivated Turkish elites to actively, if not desperate-
ly, seek security partnerships with the West.107 This 
search later translated into Turkey’s energetic push to 
become a member of NATO, which eventually suc-
ceeded in 1952. In a similar vein, denying Russia a 
significant presence to the south of Turkey’s borders 
or the Eastern Mediterranean has been a continuous 
policy position – from the Ottoman Empire to the 
Turkish republic. In recent years, it appears as if Tur-
key has lost this strategic clarity with regard to its 
policy towards Russia’s geopolitical expansion. At 
present, Russia is not only Turkey’s northern neigh-
bour, it is also Turkey’s southern and north-eastern 
neighbour. Russia’s growing presence in the Eastern 
Mediterranean is reducing Turkey’s strategic autono-
my and room for manoeuvre there. The loss of strate-
gic orientation in Turkish foreign policy, coupled 
with the troubles in Turkey’s traditional alliance 
structure, is keeping Turkey from sufficiently appre-
ciating the geopolitical challenge that Russia poses to 
Turkey as a result of it being present on almost all 
of its borders. Yet, once some level of calm and nor-
malcy prevails in Ankara, it is inevitable that Turkey 
will be disturbed by Russia’s strong military presence 
in its neighbourhood. Turkey is likely to see this pres-
ence both as a geopolitical challenge and a threat. 
Third, Turkey and Russia have had different stand-
ings on the international status quo. At the interna-
tional level, despite enjoying its UNSC seat and 
desiring to keep the UN design as it is, Russia still 
behaves as a revisionist power. It is particularly 
seeking changes to the post–Cold War international 
order and parity with the US. In contrast, despite 
Turkey’s political parlance of the last decade, which 
has demanded a more prominent international role 
and status for the country, it has essentially been a 
status quo power at the international level. It has 
asked for the reform of international institutions 
 
107 Some scholars contest this official historiography. For 
such a contestation, see Behlül Özkan, “The 1945 Turkish-
Soviet Crisis”, Russia in Global Affairs 18, no. 2 (2020): 156–
187. 
(particularly the UN) and the international order,108 
but it has also been very consciously demanding the 
maintenance of both the post–Second World War 
and post–Cold War international order and institu-
tions, though in a reformed way, given that Turkey 
was a beneficiary of this order. In the same vein, 
despite Turkey’s search for new partners at the inter-
national level, in the foreseeable future, Russia does 
not have the capacity – nor China as well for that 
matter – to replace Turkish-Western relations. How-
ever, as a result of the increasingly close relations 
between Ankara and Moscow (coupled with the 
growing gap between Turkey and the West, both in 
the domestic and foreign policy realms), the nature, 
meaning, and content of Turkish-Western relations 
are undergoing major changes, and Turkey’s place in 
the broader Western system is increasingly being 
questioned. Going forward, these developments, in 
turn, will trigger more calls both in the West and in 
Turkey to redefine the framework and meaning of 
Turkish-Western relations, as the Cold War frame-
work between Turkey and the US as well as the 
accession framework of Turkish-European relations 
increasingly appear to be ill-suited to the present 
realities. 
Finally, Turkish-Russian cooperation in the Middle 
East and beyond has been partially facilitated by the 
US withdrawal from – or the downsizing of its re-
gional commitments and Europe’s absence from – 
the MENA region. However, developments at the 
broader international level, a new administration in 
the US, rising tensions between Ukraine and Russia, 
and the partial reinvigoration of European and UN 
diplomacy on the Libyan crisis indicate that Turkey 
will face more constraints and higher costs for its 
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Abbreviations 
CAATSA Countering America’s Adversaries Through 
Sanctions Act 
CENTCOM US Central Command 
GNA Government of National Accord 
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
LNA Libyan National Army 
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas 
MENA Middle East and North Africa 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
PKK Kurdistan Workers’ Party 
PYD Democratic Union Party 
UAE United Arab Emirates 
UN United Nations 
UNSC United Nation Security Council 
US United States 
YPG People’s Protection Units 
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